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Abstract
Women are often perceived as more nurturing and peaceful
than males. Thus, when a woman commits the violent crime of
terrorism, it captures the attention of media, which frames the
perception of women in a feminine and submissive light. This
Comment explores the impact and presence of framing narratives
by analyzing the sentences of males and females charged with
terrorism offenses in America since the rise of ISIS. After noting the
disparity overall, the Comment focuses on four pairs of cases and
the commentary in each case. The pairs were chosen because the
male and female actors committed similar crimes, but the sentences
had a disparity of years. After the disparity is unveiled, this
Comment explores the types of narratives, and how each narrative
differed between the males and females, before ultimately
proposing solutions to bridge the disparities.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“Never before in the modern history of terrorism has a group
attracted so many women, particularly from the West.”1
Women are often portrayed in the media as soft, nurturing, and
motherly. Thus, no one would expect a woman to commit atrocious
acts, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the Boston Marathon
Bombings.2 Yet, women — particularly from the West — have joined
the Islamic State (ISIS) at an unprecedented rate.3 Given the
increase in participation, it is no surprise that prosecutors in the
United States have started to charge more women with terrorismrelated offenses for their involvement with the group.
The media coverage surrounding the women who have joined
terrorist groups tends to focus on their femininity, framing them as

* Juris Doctor Candidate, UIC John Marshall Law School, Class of 2020.
Thank you to my family, friends, and all those who supported me. A special
thank you to my mentors, who spent countless hours nurturing my passion for
learning and writing.
1. JESSICA DAVIS, WOMEN IN MODERN TERRORISM: FROM LIBERATION WARS
TO GLOBAL JIHAD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE 123 (2017).
2. Karla J. Cunningham, Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism, 26
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 171, 171-72 (2003). “Because women are not
considered credible or likely perpetrators of terrorist violence, they can more
easily carry out attacks and assist their organizations.” Id.
3. DAVIS, supra note 1 (stating, “[w]omen have begun to join the group in
shocking numbers . . . . Even in comparison to [al-Qaeda in Iraq], the number of
women joining ISI[S] is unprecedented”).
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boy-crazed “lipstick martyrs.”4 These framing5 techniques lead to a
perception that female terrorists are less of a threat than male
terrorists.6 In turn, the sentencing disparities between males and
females convicted of terrorism offenses since the rise of ISIS are
striking. Identifying the role that framing plays in sentencing will
allow the criminal justice system to deliver more equitable
sentences.
Part II of this Comment will explore the background of
terrorism and ISIS. It will first focus on how members of this
particular terrorist group are prosecuted in the United States.
Then, it will review the role of women within ISIS, generally. Next,
this Comment will analyze the problem of framing surrounding
female terrorists and the impact such frames have on the legal
system. Finally, this portion of the Comment will address the two
main terrorism charges that both male and female terrorists face.
Part III of this Comment will dive into the sentencing data of
males and females convicted of two terrorism-related offenses in
America based on their involvement with ISIS. It will start by
addressing the sentencing data as a whole. Then, it will analyze the
frames surrounding specific women and men sentenced for similar
terrorism offenses in the United States since the rise of ISIS. This
section will then discuss the types of frames that are common
among both the males and females. In addition to analyzing the
common frames, this section will discuss the differences between
the frames used based on the sex of the individual.
Part IV of this Comment will discuss the policy changes needed
to combat the problem of disparate sentencing between males and
females. It will begin by discussing the need for awareness of
framing and its impact. Then, it will discuss the viability of
imposing sentencing guidelines. Finally, the Comment will propose
combatting the impacts of sentencing disparities through a
4. Brigitte L. Nacos, The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media:
Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in
Terrorism, 28 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 435, 438-39 (2005) (describing
the prevalence of media sources focusing on the physical appearance of female
terrorists and the image of women terrorists acting for the sake of love).
5. In this comment, the phrases “framing” and “frames” refer to the
rhetorical devices used to describe both male and female criminal defendants
charged with terrorism offenses. Analyzing the rhetoric surrounding both can
offer an insight into the perceptions of the defendants from the legal
professionals involved. See e.g., Jessica Hullman & Nicholas Diakopoulos,
Visualization Rhetoric: Framing Effects in Narrative Visualization, 17 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON VISUALIZATION & COMPUTER GRAPHICS 2231, 2232 (2011)
(stating that “[r]esearchers seek to better understand ‘framing effects’,
situations where often small changes in the presentation of an issue or an event,
such as slight modifications of phrasing, produce measurable changes of
opinion”).
6. Nacos, supra note 4, at 447-48. Terrorist groups will continue to exploit
the media portrayals of female terrorists being weaker, particularly in “target
societies that deem women far less suspect and dangerous than men.” Id.
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rehabilitation program as a way to address the underlying issue
behind sentencing disparities.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF SENTENCING
DISPARITIES
Before discussing the sentencing disparities, it is important to
understand how an individual is charged for terrorism offenses.
First, this section will briefly discuss the history of ISIS and how
the group operates within the United States. Next, it is necessary
to understand the roles that women have in terrorist organizations,
as that may impact how individual women are sentenced.
Afterwards, this section will contextualize how female terrorists are
portrayed in the media. Finally, this section will give an overview
of how terrorism-related crimes are charged in the United States.

A. Terrorism and the Rise of ISIS
An act of terrorism is typically defined as “pre-meditated,
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience.”7 A recent conceptualization of
this definition is the beheading of American journalist James Foley8
in 2014 — an event that captured the attention of American media
because it was filmed and broadcasted online.9 The video was titled
“A Message To America.”10 In it, an ISIS fighter with a British
accent warned America of a new Islamic army and of the measures
the new army would take if America continued with its drone
strikes and aggression in the Middle East.11 While the video did not
show much of the actual beheading, it ended with footage of Foley’s
severed head and a warning that the beheadings would continue if
America did not stand down.12 The publicized beheading brought
widespread recognition to ISIS and inspired the mobilization of
thousands of Western supporters.13
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2018).
8. JESSICA STERN & J. M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 120 (2015).
James Foley was an American reporter who was kidnapped in 2012 while
working in Syria. Id. His beheading death in August 2014 was widely publicized
in Western media. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 120-121 (describing the video in greater detail).
12. Id. The ISIS fighter could be heard saying, “[t]he life of [Steven Sotloff,
another American journalist], Obama, depends on your decision.” Id. With this
and similar videos, ISIS was able to combine storytelling with scenes of
gruesome violence. Id.
13. Daniel L. Byman, Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals,
Different Targets, BROOKINGS (Apr. 29, 2015), www.brookings.edu/testimonies/
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In 2004, a Jordanian named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed the
group that would later be known as ISIS.14 The group itself started
as a branch of al-Qaeda,15 known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).16 As the
years progressed, al-Zarqawi began to lead a brutal campaign
including mass killings of Shia Muslims.17 He also encouraged
vicious tactics, like beheadings, which caused tension with the
central leadership of al-Qaeda, who advocated for a more patient
strategy in the wake of 9/11, in order to keep a low-profile.18 The
decline of AQI began in 2006, when American forces killed alZarqawi in a bomb strike.19 Between 2007 and 2010, attacks by U.S.
troops weakened AQI.20 This allowed Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali
al-Badri al-Samarra’iyy (known more commonly as Abu Bakr alBaghdadi) to rise through the ranks of AQI.21 In 2010, al-Baghdadi
became the leader of an umbrella branch of AQI, known as the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).22 Soon after taking over, al-Baghdadi
rebuilt the weakened group’s capabilities by eliminating critics and
declaring an expansion of ISI to Syria.23
By 2013, al-Baghdadi’s ISI was carrying out numerous attacks
each month in Iraq, becoming a deadly force.24 At the same time,
the rebellion in Syria against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was
gaining traction, especially with a group known as al-Nusra Front.25
comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/. “Zarqawi and
his followers also acted with incredible brutality, making their name with
gruesome beheading videos—a tactic that its successor organizations would also
use to shock and generate publicity.” Id.
14. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at xix (giving a timeline of the
establishment of ISIS); What is ‘Islamic State’?, BBC (Dec. 2, 2015),
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.
15. DANIEL L. BYMAN, DEADLY CONNECTIONS: STATES THAT SPONSOR
TERRORISM (2005). Al-Qaeda was founded in August 1988, following an uprising
in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979. Id. The small
group grew in Afghanistan until 1992, then it spread to Sudan and began
developing relationships with Sunni extremist and insurgent groups. Id. This
is likely where the group began its roots of calling for an American jihad, or a
war against non-Muslims. Id.
16. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at xix; What is ‘Islamic State’?, supra
note 14.
17. JOBY WARRICK, BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS 201 (2015).
18. Id. There was a point in time where “Osama bin-Laden’s top deputy had
gently reprimanded Zarqawi for his gratuitous use of violence” followed by, “a
much sharper rebuke from one of Osama bin-Laden’s closest advisors” after a
campaign of violence lead by AQI. Id.
19. Id. at 206-220 (discussing American military actions against AQI,
culminating in the death of al-Zarqawi).
20. What is ‘Islamic State’?, supra note 14.
21. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at 37.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 37-39.
24. What is ‘Islamic State’?, supra note 14.
25. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at 41-42. The al-Nusra Front was one of
the main groups committed to overthrowing the Assad regime during the Arab
Spring. Id. Initially, the al-Nusra Front employed brutal tactics. Id. In the
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Al-Baghdadi, to the dismay and disapproval of al-Qaeda and alNusra leaders, captivated some of al-Nusra’s members.26 After
former members of al-Nusra joined ISI, the group rebranded itself
as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), in reference to its new
Syrian members.27 At this time, al-Qaeda began to denounce ISIS’s
heavy handed tactics, leading ISIS to create its own, autonomous
entity.28
Once ISIS gained notoriety for the beheading of James Foley
in 2014, world leaders began working to defeat the group. Under the
Obama administration, the United States, in particular,
concentrated on employing a series of air and drone strikes against
the group.29 This was an attempt to push back and corner ISIS
fighters, as well as to disrupt the infrastructure ISIS put in place in
the cities it controlled.30 Particularly, in April 2016, the group lost
its major footholds near Kirkuk and Sinjar—two cities in Iraq.31 In
July 2017, U.S.-backed local forces regained control of the major city
of Mosul, Iraq.32 Mosul had been ISIS’s largest stronghold in the
summer of 2012, however, the group began to align itself with more moderate
nationalist groups. Id. By the end of 2012, according to Aaron Zelin, the alNusra Front was “one of the opposition’s best fighting forces, and locals viewed
its members as fair arbiters when dealing with corruption and social services.”
Id.
26. Id. (describing that “[o]n April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced a merger of
ISI and al Nusra, calling the new group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIS)… the announcement surprised both Zawahiri [the leader of al-Qaeda]
and Jawlani [the leader of al Nusra]”).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 69 (explaining, “Zawahiri finally played his only remaining card,
issuing a statement in February 2014 that publicly disavowed ISIS, essentially
firing it from the al Qaeda affiliate network”); Daniel L. Byman, Will ISIS and
al-Qaida Always Be Rivals?, BROOKINGS (May 27, 2016), www.brookings.edu/
blog/markaz/2016/05/27/will-isis-and-al-qaida-always-be-rivals/. Although alQaeda and ISIS both believe that Islamic law should govern the world, the
groups differ in the strategies they employ. Id. ISIS prioritizes building a state.
Id. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, prioritizes striking Western countries and
building a state only when the “conditions are ripe.” Id.
29. Obama Appears At Pentagon To Discuss Strategy For Countering ISIS,
PBS (Aug. 4, 2016), www.pbs.org/newshour/show/obama-appears-pentagondiscuss-strategy-countering-isis.
30. Id. (mentioning, “the U.S. launched a series of air and drone strikes
against the Islamic State's Libyan stronghold, in and around the town of Sirte.
The U.S. air campaign comes in support of a Libyan government-backed
coalition of brigades and militias fighting ISIS on the ground”); Eyder Peralta,
Listen: Obama Explains His Approach To ISIS In 7 Minutes, NPR (Mar. 23,
2016), www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/23/471601155/listen-obamaexplains-his-approach-to-isis-in-7-minutes.
31. Vera Mironova & Mohammed Hussein, The Downfall of ISIS: Why
Foreign Fighters Have Become a Liability, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 26, 2016),
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-09-26/downfall-isis. Kirkuk and
Sinjar are both located in Iraq. Id.
32. Daniel L. Byman, What Happens When ISIS Goes Underground?,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 18, 2018), www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/18/whathappens-when-isis-goes-underground/.
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country.33 The last major nail in the coffin was when U.S.-backed
forces overtook ISIS’s capital city, Raqqa, Syria.34 This caused the
group to retreat underground.35 Yet at that point, ISIS’s ideological
impacts had spread much further than the confines of the Middle
East.36
One noteworthy trend that made ISIS unique was the
mobilization of Western foreign fighters who traveled or attempted
to travel to the areas that ISIS controlled since its rise in 2014.37
According to Peter R. Neumann,38 the total number of foreign
fighters that traveled to join ISIS exceeded 20,000 by the beginning
of 2015.39 One-fifth of those fighters were either nationals or
inhabitants of Western European countries.40 The European
country with the most foreign fighters who joined ISIS per capita
was Belgium.41
Equally noteworthy was the group’s penchant for using social
media to create and spread propaganda in a low-cost and intimate
way, because it allowed the propagandists to spread information to
users directly.42 This effectively allowed for “every jihadist [to
become] his or her own media outlet, reporting live from the
frontline in tweets, offering enticing visions of domestic bliss via
short films and images posted to JustPaste.it and Instagram, [and]
entering into friendly conversations via Skype.”43 Recent research
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Warning that ISIS may “go underground, disrupt politics and foster
sectarianism; wage an insurgency; and then come roaring back,” like AQI did in
the past. Id.
36. Id. (cautioning, “the Islamic State has nurtured the flame of jihad around
the world. Even as the group declines, the ideas it champions—the necessity of
a caliphate, the glory of brutality and the evil of Western states—have spread
further, as the staggering volume of foreign fighters suggests. The Islamic
State’s propaganda is extensive and almost ubiquitous”).
37. LORENZO VIDINO & SEAMUS HUGHES, GEO. WASH. U. PROGRAM ON
EXTREMISM, ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA ix (2015). ISIS
foreign fighters have not been as prevalent in America as in other countries. Id.
However, as of fall 2015, American security forces estimate that 250 Americans
have traveled or attempted to travel to join ISIS. Id. At that time, security forces
were also investigating 900 active cases against ISIS sympathizers across
America. Id.
38. Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds
20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s, ICSR (Jan. 26, 2015),
www.icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. Peter R. Neumann is the Director of the
International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at 149 (explaining, “at its peak, [Twitter]
was a formidable force [for ISIS], sending groups of hundreds of tweets at
periodic intervals carefully timed to avoid raising red flags with Twitter’s
automatic antispam protocols”).
43. ABDEL BARI ATWAN, ISLAMIC STATE: THE DIGITAL CALIPHATE 17-18
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has outlined the fact that the internet has made it easier to plan
attacks, make weapons, and join like-minded groups.44 Particularly,
lone wolf attackers45 are able to find resources online that could help
them carry out attacks and increase their radical beliefs in forums
with like-minded individuals.46 In fact, over one-third of lone wolf
attackers in the U.S. had virtual communication with political
activists prior to their attacks.47
Foreign fighters and online recruitment have posed significant
legal challenges for the United States government. Foreign fighters
carry the risk of perpetrating their own attacks in their home
country once they have returned.48 It is impossible to know whether
disenchanted foreign fighters are genuine in their deradicalization
or if they continue to pose a threat to national security.49 When
combatting online recruitment, the government must balance
prosecuting individuals who post terrorist speech on social media
with the individual’s right to free speech.50 There is also a risk that
imprisonment could further radicalize individuals and only delay
future terrorist attacks.51 This risk of recidivism creates the
(2015).
44. Katie Cohen, et al., Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in
Social Media, 26 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 246 (2014).
45. Ramon Spaaij, The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment, 33
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 854, 856 (2010). “Lone wolf terrorism” refers
to attacks carried out by one person. Id. This type of extremism is
distinguishable from attacks organized and carried out by terrorist
organizations. Id.
46. Gabriel Weimann, Www.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the
Internet, 116 U.S. INST. PEACE 1, 9-10 (2004). Terrorists can use the internet to
coordinate attacks, share information on targets, and share other relevant
information to help others carry out attacks. Id.
47. Paul Gill, et al., Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent
Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists, 59 J. FORENSIC SCI. 425, 430 (2014) (stating,
“33.6% of the sample had recently joined a wider group, organization, or
movement that engaged in contentious politics. … A similar number (31.9%)
had also become recently exposed to new social movement or terrorism-related
media”).
48. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8, at 98 (noting, “there were unrepentant
fighters who returned either of their own accord or at the direction of ISIS,
presenting a very high risk that they would carry out terrorist attacks on behalf
of the group”).
49. Id. (theorizing, “[i]t was in the interest of Western governments to see
radicals disengage with their extremist causes, but it was impossible to know
for certain who was sincere and who presented a risk of future terrorism”).
50. Zachary Leibowitz, Terror on Your Timeline: Criminalizing Terrorist
Incitement on Social Media Through Doctrinal Shift, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 795,
814 (2017); Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist
Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV 605, 616 (2017) (proposing, “[t]he compelling
public interest in preventing mass casualties from terrorist attacks can be
furthered by enforcing a narrowly tailored law against knowingly disseminating
terrorist content through social media websites”).
51. U.N. Security Council Counter Terrorism Comm. Exec. Directorate, The
Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research
Perspectives 1, 14 (2018) (hypothesizing, “there is a risk that imprisonment may
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possibility for ongoing national security threats.52
Despite these legal challenges, between March 2014 and
September 2018, 166 individuals in the United States have been
charged with “offenses related to the Islamic State.”53 Of those 166,
eighty-nine percent are male.54 This is likely because the group
previously discouraged females from engaging in combat.55
Recently, however, ISIS advertised the deployment of female
fighters.56 This significant change in stance may pose a substantial
counter-terrorism threat because of how easily female terrorists fly
below the radar in both counter-terrorism policies and in the
media.57

B. The Roles of Women in ISIS
In the 1980s, terrorists created magazines filled with
propaganda and delivered them via mail to local audiences.58 Now,
ISIS has revolutionized the recruitment process through their use
of social media and the internet.59 ISIS recruiters often befriend
young, vulnerable women on social media.60 ISIS uses this method
only delay the threat posed by these individuals, not reduce it. [Foreign fighters]
may regard their time in prison as an opportunity to continue the “struggle,”
and create new networks or organizational structures with the intent of
conducting operational activity upon their release”).
52. Id.
53. GW Extremism Tracker: The Islamic State in America, GEO. WASH. U.
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM (Sept. 2018), www.extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/
files/zaxdzs2191/f/September%202018%20Update.pdf [hereinafter, “Extremism
Tracker Report”]. Of the 166 total individuals, “115 individuals have pleaded or
were found guilty.” Id.
54. Id.
55. Charlie Winter, ISIS, Women and Jihad: Breaking with Convention,
TONY
BLAIR
INST.
FOR
GLOBAL
CHANGE
1,
8
(2018),
institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/ISIS-Women-and-Jihad-BreakingWith-Convention.pdf.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id. at 13 (noting, “[e]ven if ISIS’s recent [depiction of female fighters]
does not manifest in a mass mobilisation of female fighters, it is likely to have
a long-term impact.… In view of that, counter- terrorism practitioners must not
disregard the potential threat posed by female jihadis; indeed, it could be
significantly more substantial than the conventional wisdom states”).
58. STERN & BERGER, supra note 8.
59. ABDEL-BARI ATWAN, ISLAMIC STATE: THE DIGITAL CALIPHATE 17-18
(2015). The ISIS fighters act as a sort of “media outlet, reporting live from the
frontline in tweets, offering enticing visions of domestic bliss via short films and
images posted to JustPaste.it and Instagram, entering into friendly
conversations via Skype.” Id. This allows potential recruits to get a compelling
glimpse into the life of an ISIS fighter. Id.
60. Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS and the Lonely American, N.Y. TIMES (June
27, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruitingamerican.html; Anna Erelle, Skyping With The Enemy: I Went Undercover as a
Jihadi Girlfriend, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/may/26/french-journalist-poses-muslim-convert-isis-anna-erelle.
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to gradually introduce extremist beliefs to women before convincing
them to join their fight abroad.61
1. Recruiters
Once recruited, women fill a variety of roles within ISIS. One
of the most significant roles is disseminating propaganda and acting
as recruiters.62 There are numerous women, known as Umms — a
honorific name — who post content outside of the conflict zones.63
These women work to broadcast ISIS propaganda and generate
content that blends “jihadist rhetoric and the Internet speak of
millennials” to attract Western followers.64 For example, one
woman known as “Shams”65 posted: “When is winter in Syria? Do
they have snow in Tabqah? I want to make a snow man &amp; [sic]
myself will become Elsa the Snow Queen! #disney #IS #joke.”66 The
post included a reference to the Disney film Frozen, indicating to
her followers that it was also popular in Syria.67 Another account,
run
by
recruiter
the
Abu
Dujana
al-Muhajir,
or
@AbuDujanaBritani, resembled the popular “Dear Abby” column
and aimed to answer questions from Western recruits about what
life was like in the Islamic State.68
2. Auxiliary Roles
Additionally, women tend to fill traditional auxiliary roles,
such as wives and mothers. Once women arrive in ISIS territory,
61. William A. Costanza, Adjusting Our Gaze: An Alternative Approach to
Understanding Youth Radicalization, 8 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 1, 11 (2015)
(explaining, “[t]he aim of the recruiter is to move the individual to increasingly
more extreme positions and perhaps eventual recruitment into the extremist
organization”).
62. DAVIS, supra note 1 (explaining “[m]any of ISIL’s most vehement
supporters online are women and they work to spread the group’s message. The
women who have traveled overseas to join the group are also using social media
to encourage others to join”).
63. Jytte Klausen, Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, 38 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1, 16
(2015). Many women fill the vital role of propagandists in the larger social
media networks that are linked to ISIS. Id.
64. Id.
65. Atika Shubert, The Women of ISIS: Who Are They?, CNN (May 29, 2015),
www.cnn.com/2015/05/29/middleeast/who-are-the-women-of-isis/index.html.
Shams is the pseudonym for a woman who runs the Diary of a Muhajirah blog,
which tracks the life of one woman in ISIS. Id. She is believed to be a Malaysian
doctor, though this information has not been verified. Id. The blog focuses on
Sham’s love life, the benefits of joining ISIS, and tips for new recruits. Id.
66. Ellie Hall, An ISIS Love Story: “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part,” BUZZFEED
(Sept. 17, 2014), www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ellievhall/an-isis-love-storytill-martyrdom-do-us-part.
67. Id.
68. Klausen, supra note 63, at 8.
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they are quickly married off to become brides and mothers.69 In fact,
forty-eight percent of women have primary roles as wives in ISIS.70
This is an integral role because they help nurture and raise the next
generation of extremists. Unlike other terrorist groups, like alQaeda, ISIS aims to establish a caliphate and a functioning state in
addition to conquering the territory.71 This makes raising the next
generation of fighters and establishing a community to rule over, a
necessary task for the group. Certain women are also called upon to
become teachers and medical providers.72 Although these women do
not play an active role in fighting, their role in operations is still
vital to the success of the group overall.
3. Fighters
As noted previously, women are now actively participating as
fighters in the group, however, this is not a new phenomenon.73
During its first incarnation as AQI, the group notoriously used
suicide bombs as their signature mode of attack.74 According to
some estimates, between 2000 and 2009, the predecessors of ISIS
deployed 834 suicide bombs.75 The Women in Terrorism dataset
reveals that since 2003, sixty-two of those suicide attacks were
carried out by women.76
Over time, the role of women as fighters has diminished
significantly from when they were used by AQI; women were
discouraged from fighting in jihad unless there was a significant
threat or lack of male fighters.77 However, in July 2017, ISIS
released its official magazine and indicated that the time had come
for women to “rise with courage and sacrifice in this war” and go to
battle “not because of the small number of men but rather, due to
69. Audrey Alexander, Cruel Intentions: Female Jihadists in America, GEO.
WASH.
U.
PROGRAM
ON
EXTREMISM
1,
2
(2016)
extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/Female%20Jihadists
%20in%20America.pdf
70. Amanda N. Spencer, The Hidden Face of Terrorism: An Analysis of the
Women in Islamic State, 9 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 74, 90 (2016). In a study of
seventy-two female ISIS operatives, forty were “playing the role of a jihadist
wife.” Id.
71. Elizabeth Pearson, The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for
Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad, 8 POL’Y
& INTERNET 1, 5 (2015).
72. Winter, supra note 55, at 8.
73. DAVIS, supra note 1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Charlie Winter & Devorah Margolin, The Mujahidat Dilemma: Female
Combatants and the Islamic State, 10 CTC SENTINEL 23, 25 (2017). “[J]ihadis
have tended to coalesce around the view that women… should not engage in
combative jihad — unless, that is, extenuating circumstances demand
otherwise.” Id. at 24.
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their love for jihad, their desire to sacrifice for the sake of Allah, and
their desire for Jannah.”78 This, however, is misleading, as the
number of male fighters has dwindled since ISIS began to lose
territory.79 The Radicalization Awareness Network estimated in
July 2017 that approximately thirty percent of the 5,000 European
Union foreign fighters returned to their home countries.80
Nevertheless, the deadly nature of the call to arms is in stark
contrast to the narratives perpetuated by the media.

C. Framing Narratives
Women are often seen as less suspicious than men because
they are typically seen as nurturing and nonviolent.81 Because the
goals of destruction inherent in terrorism contrast so sharply with
the traditional image of femininity, attacks carried out by females
often generate more publicity for the terrorist organization.82
However, Western media reports of these women often focus on
their personal life rather than on their larger political goals.83
One example of a woman whose actions were diminished by the
media was Muriel Degauque.84 Degauque made headlines in 2005
when she completed a suicide bombing attack after converting to a
radical form of Islam.85 Notably, she was a Belgian-born woman —
making her the “first European Muslim woman to stage a suicide
attack.”86 In English newspapers she was described as being
“brainwashed” by her husband, and discredited because of her
78. Id. at 23-24. The statements “seemed to suggest that the caliphate had
at least rhetorically lifted its moratorium on female combatants.” Id.
79. RICHARD BARRETT, SOUFAN CTR. BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: FOREIGN
FIGHTERS AND THE THREAT OF RETURNEES 1, 9 (Oct. 2017) (analyzing the threat
of foreign fighters, specifically after ISIS began to retreat and lose territory in
2017).
80. Id. at 10 (noting, “[i]n some cases, for example in Denmark, Sweden and
the United Kingdom, the number was closer to half. Earlier that year, in
February, President Putin said that 10% of the 9,000 foreign fighters from
Russia and former republics of the Soviet Union had returned”).
81. Christine Sixta, The Illusive Third Wave: Are Female Terrorists the New
“New Women” in Developing Societies?, 29 J. WOMEN, POL. & POL’Y 261 (2008).
82. Id. News sources tend to flock to these female terrorists because the
image of a young woman, who is supposed to be nurturing and peaceful,
choosing to kill herself and others is particularly heinous to society. Id.
83. Nacos, supra note 4, at 438-39.
84. Katherine E. Brown, Muriel’s Wedding: News Media Representations of
Europe’s First Female Suicide Terrorist, 14 EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD. 705, 710
(2011) (arguing, “in news reporting female suicide terrorists are frequently
denied agency in the public sphere and become the ‘pawns’ of men”).
85. Nicholas Watt, From Belgian Cul-de-sac to Suicide Bomber in Iraq,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2005), www.theguardian.com/world/2005/dec/02/iraq.islam;
Craig S. Smith, Raised as Catholic in Belgium, She Died as a Muslim Bomber,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2005), www.nytimes.com/2005/12/06/world/europe/raisedas-catholic-in-belgium-she-died-as-a-muslim-bomber.html.
86. Smith, supra note 85.
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history of drug abuse, failed relationships, and sexual escapades.87
Furthermore, she was frequently infantilized by the media.88
This portrayal is not unusual. Women who carry out terrorist
attacks have been described as “lipstick martyrs”89 and portrayed
as only joining terrorist groups because their husbands or
boyfriends did.90 Reports of these women often focus on their
personal life, rather than their larger political goals.91 More
recently, the women who join ISIS have been repeatedly referred to
by Western media sources as “Jihadi Brides.”92 Yet, research
demonstrates the notion that romance and sex is the primary
motive for female ISIS recruits simply holds no water.93
The media’s impact on society’s perception may be reflected
through judges and lawyers, who are tasked with charging the
females who commit terrorist attacks. Thus, an exploration of the
sentencing and narratives behind the sentences is necessary to gain
an understanding of the factors behind each sentence. In order to
effectively understand the impact of the narratives, it is important
to discuss the types of charges that terrorists face.

D. Charges and Sentencing
While everyone remembers the act of violence, lost in
translation throughout all the chaos, are the charges that terrorists
face after being intercepted by authorities. Two charges commonly
overlooked by the public are (1) Providing Material Support to
Terrorist Groups94 and (2) Making False Material Statements.95
87. Brown, supra note 84, at 710.
88. Id. For instance, the media often focused on Degaugue’s husband and his
involvement in her radicalization. Id at 711. This implies that Degauge’s actions
were “the responsibility of a man” rather than of an autonomous woman. Id.
89. RABAB IBRAHIM ABDULHADI, ET AL., ARAB AND ARAB AMERICAN
FEMINISMS: GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND BELONGING 44 (2011). The term “lipstick
martyr” was coined by Western Media to refer to female suicide bombers. Id.
The term has sexual connotations because the media seemed “more interested
in the woman’s ‘plucked eyebrows’ and ‘ruby lips’ than in the causes and
consequences of [the attack].” Id.
90. Nacos, supra note 4, at 438-41.
91. Id.
92. Meredith Loken & Anna Zelenz, Explaining Extemism: Western Women
in Daesh, 3 EUR. J. INT’L SECURITY 45, 50 (2017) (explaining, “the media,
frequently painting the muhajirat as ‘jihadi brides’, encourages this narrative.
One Quilliam Foundation researcher notes that some women may view joining
[ISIS] as a ‘romantic adventure’ where they have more options in choosing a
like-minded partner than if they remained at home”).
93. Id. at 57 (noting, “[f]emale recruits acknowledge and reject Western
governments’ and the media’s sexualisation of them. They firmly deny a ‘sexual
jihad’ and chide Western commentators for accusing them of extramarital sex”).
94. Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2018);
Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018).
95. Statements or Entries Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018).
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1. Material Support to Terrorist Groups
A person commits the crime of providing material support to
terrorist groups when they provide measures of aid to a terrorist
organization.96 Mere association or membership in a terrorist
organization is not enough to be charged;97 however, the statute
does criminalize “aid that makes the [terrorist] attacks more likely
to occur.”98 This can encompass a variety of activities, from
providing small monetary donations to a terrorist group99 or
committing a violent attack on behalf of the group.100 Material
support statutes have been the primary mode of terrorism
prosecution for the U.S. Department of Justice since the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks.101 Judicial discretion is key in terrorism
sentencing as the sentencing range itself is wide, from no
mandatory minimum to a “maximum prison sentence of 20 years
per count,” or life in prison if the offense caused a death.102

96. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2018). “Material Support” is defined as providing
“property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials” to terrorist
organizations. Id.
97. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (reasoning
that § 2339B does not violate the First Amendment because “[t]he statute does
not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind. Section 2339B also
does not prevent [plaintiffs] from becoming members of the [terrorist
organizations] or impose any sanction on them for doing so”) (internal
quotations omitted).
98. Id. at 35.
99. Kelly Berkell, Risk Reduction in Terrorism Cases: Sentencing and the
Post- Conviction Environment, 13 J. DERADICALIZATION 276, 286 (2017)
(identifying, “individual efforts to raise small amounts of money to contribute
to [a foreign terrorist organization], whether successful or not, would constitute
material support violations”); George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial—
Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and The Role of The Judge after
United States v. Mehanna, 4 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 1, 3 (2013) (noting, “the
problem is that the defendants found at one end of this spectrum will not have
done all that much”).
100. Berkell, supra note 99, at 286 (explaining, “[o]n the opposite end of the
spectrum, material support violations may involve more direct links to violence,
and more extensive cooperation with violent extremist individuals or groups”).
101. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected
Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 723 (2009) (elaborating, “[a]lthough
rarely enforced before 9/11, [§ 2339B] has since become a principal tool in the
Justice Department's 'terrorism' prosecutions”).
102. Berkell, supra note 99, at 310.
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2. False Material Statements
The crime of making false material statements involves
conveying deceptive or fraudulent statements to federal officials.103
A statement is material if it could have influenced or misdirected a
government investigator.104 This particular charge is used to
prosecute a variety of crimes, including white-collar offenses and,
as analyzed here, terrorism offenses.105 The charge itself has been
used in terrorism-related offenses since the late 1990s, even though
the maximum sentence at that time was five years.106 In 2004,
Congress expanded the maximum sentence for terrorism-related
offenses under this charge to eight years, although federal courts
have often maintained the maximum at five years — as dictated
under the statute.107
Based on sentencing databases, these charges are among the
most common charges that both males and females accused of
terrorism face.108 Thus, by analyzing the sentencing data
surrounding the charges, the sentencing disparities between males
and females will become clearer.

103. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining
that § 1001 “criminalizes [the act of] knowingly and willfully making any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement to federal officials”).
104. Id. “To satisfy the materiality requirement of section 1001(a)(2), a
statement must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, a governmental function. But the statement need not actually have
influenced the governmental function. It is enough that the statement could
have provoked governmental action.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
105. Andrea C. Halverson & Eric D. Olson, False Statements and False
Claims, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555, 558 (2009). § 1001 has been used to prosecute
government officials, health care executives, and terrorists. Id. (citing Dan
Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges; Statistics Often Count Lesser Crimes, WASH. POST (June 12, 2005),
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR200506110038
1.html).
106. Jeff Breinholt, A Crime for All Seasons: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and
Counterterrorism, 84 TENN. L. REV. 603, 608 (2017). For example, Ahmed
Ressam was charged under § 1001 in late 1999. Id. He gave a false name to
authorities after trying to enter the U.S. from Canada. Id. Authorities also
found explosives in his car. Id.
107. Id. at 604-05 (explaining, “even though Congress has made those § 1001
violations involv[ing] international or domestic terrorism into a crime with an
eight-year (as opposed to five-year) maximum sentence, courts seem to have not
been shy about scrutinizing this enhancement when sought by prosecutors”)
(internal quotations omitted).
108. The Cases, GW PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, www.extremism.gwu.edu/
cases (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); Trevor Aaronson & Margot Williams, Trial
and Terror, INTERCEPT (Dec. 2019), trial-and-terror.theintercept.com.
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III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze the sentencing data of both males and
females charged with Material Support (18 U.S.C. § 2339A or §
2339B) and Making False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001). First, the
section will begin by describing the process by which the sentencing
data was obtained. Next, it will analyze the results of the data,
generally. Then, it will evaluate cases of specific women and men
who were convicted under these statutes and the comments that
their attorneys, prosecutors, or judges made during the course of
the sentencing. This will culminate in a comparison and analysis of
the framing narratives revealed through the statements. This
section will conclude with a discussion of the policy implications
that arise from the findings.

A. Methodology
To begin the analysis of the sentencing data, this author
researched the profiles and cases of 166 individuals charged with
terrorism offenses in the U.S. between March 2014 and September
2018.109 Of these 166 individuals, 10 were female offenders, and the
rest were male.110 First, the data set was narrowed to only include
individuals who were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 or 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A or 2339B, the two most common charges.111 Then, all
offenders who had: (1) not been sentenced, (2) received only
probation, and (3) were sentenced as juveniles were removed. Next,
the data was narrowed to include only the offenders who pled guilty,
as opposed to being found guilty or innocent by the jury. This was
done because only one female, Noor Zahi Salman,112 went before a
jury, but she was acquitted.113 The purpose of narrowing the data
was to gain a more equitable data set. The resulting data set
included 62 individuals total. Of those 62 individuals, nine were
female. The final data set is as follows:
Table: Sentencing Statistics Based on Sex and Charge
Months
Name

Sex

Sentenced

Charge

Abood, Bilal114

M

48

1001

109. The Cases, supra note 108.
110. Id.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2018); see id. (listing all
offenses).
112. Indictment, United States v. Salman, 6:17-cr-00018-ORL-40KRS 1
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2017); The Cases, supra note 108.
113. The Cases, supra note 108.
114. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Abood, 3-15-MJ-316 (N.D. Tex.
May 13, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
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Ahmed, Hamza Naj115

M

120

1001

Ali, Mohommad116

M

12

1001

Ali, Sumiya117

F

30

1001

Ali-Skelton, Abdul Raheem Habil118

M

38

1001

Castelli, Marie119

F

90

1001

Coffman, Heather Elizabeth120

F

54

1001

Greene, Daniela121

F

24

1001

Jackson, Robert Blake122

M

36

1001

Kodaimati, Mohamad Saeed123

M

96

1001

Patel, Shivam124

M

60

1001

Cornell, Christopher Lee125

M

360

2339

Queen, Michael126

M

24

1001

Blair, Alexander127

M

15

2339

T.128

M

360

2339

Booker, John

115. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Ahmed, 15mj95 (SER) (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
116. Information, United States v. Ali, 4:17 CR 87 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2017);
The Cases, supra note 108.
117. Information, United States v. Ali, 4:17 CR 86 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2017);
The Cases, supra note 108.
118. Criminal Complaint, State of Minnesota v. Ali-Skelton, 16A35047
(Minn. Mar. 29, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
119. Indictment, United States v. Castelli, 16-33-ART-CJS (E.D. Ky. Sept.
8, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
120. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Coffman, 3:14-mj-00369-DJN
(E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Coffman Criminal Complaint]; The Cases,
supra note 108.
121. Motion to Unseal and to Substitute Redacted Versions of Some
Documents, United States v. Greene, 14-230(RC) (D. D.C. Apr. 17, 2015); The
Cases, supra note 108.
122. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Jackson, 3:16mj143 (N.D. Fla.
July 25, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
123. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Kodaimati, 15MJ1257 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
124. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Patel, 2:17mj354 (E.D. Va. June
30, 2017); The Cases, supra note 108.
125. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Cornell, 1:15mj-024 (S.D. Ohio,
Jan. 14, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
126. Indictment, United States v. Amri, 1:17-cr-50 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2017)
[hereinafter Amri Indictment]; The Cases, supra note 108.
127. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Blair, 15-mj-5040-KGS (D. Kan.
Apr. 10, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
128. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Booker, 15-mj-5039-KGS (D.
Kan. Apr. 10, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
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Brown, Avin Marsalis129

M

92

2339

Jordan, Akba Jihad130

M

108

2339

Juraboev, Abdurasul Hasanovich131

M

180

2339

Saidakhmetov, Akhror132

M

180

2339

Saleh, Munther Omar133

M

216

2339

Amin, Ali Shukri134

M

72

2339

Aziz, Jalil ibn Ameer135

M

160

2339

Conley, Shannon Maureen136

F

48

2339

Dakhlalla, Muhammad Oda137

M

96

2339

Daniels, Aaron T.138

M

80

2339

Davis, Leon Nathan, III139

M

180

2339

Edmonds, Hasan140

M

360

2339

Edmonds, Jonas141

M

252

2339

Abdihamid142

M

120

2339

Farah, Adnan

129. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Brown, 5:14-MJ-1181-WW (E.D.
N.C. Mar. 20, 2014); The Cases, supra note 108.
130 Criminal Complaint, United States v. Brown, supra note 129; The Cases,
supra note 108.
131. Criminal Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United
States v. Juraboev, 15MO172 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015); The Cases, supra note
108.
132. Criminal Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United
States v. Juraboev, supra note 131; The Cases, supra note 108.
133. Complaint, United States v. Saleh, 15M543 (E.D. N.Y. June 13, 2015);
The Cases, supra note 108.
134. Sentencing, United States v. Amin, 1:15-cr-164-CMH (E.D. Va. Aug. 28,
2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
135. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Aziz, 1:15-MJ-81 (M.D. Pa. Dec.
17, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
136. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Conley, 14-mj-01045-KLM (D.
Colo. 2014) [hereinafter Conley Criminal Complaint]; The Cases, supra note
108.
137. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Young, 3:15MJ32-SAA (E.D. Va.
Aug. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Young Complaint]; The Cases, supra note 108.
138. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Daniels. 2:16-mj-534 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 7, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
139. Indictment, United States v. Davis, CR 115-059 (S.D. Ga. May 27,
2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
140. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Edmonds, 15 CR 149 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 25, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
141. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Edmonds, supra note 140; The
Cases, supra note 108.
142. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ahmed, 15-49 (MJD/FLN)
(D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Ahmed Superseding Indictment]; The Cases,
supra note 108.
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Farrokh, Joseph Hassan143

M

102

2339

Jalloh, Mohamed Bailor144

M

132

2339

Khan, Mohammed Hamza145

M

40

2339

Lutchman, Emanuel146

M

240

2339

Musse, Hanad Mustafe147

M

120

2339

Natsheh, Islam Said148

M

60

2339

Qamar, Haris149

M

102

2339

Sayyed, Aziz150

M

180

2339

Teausant, Nicholas151

M

144

2339

Thomas, Keonna152

F

96

2339

Elshinawy, Mohamed153

M

240

2339, 1001

Al Hardan, Omar Faraj Saeed154

M

192

2339, 1001

Saadeh, Alaa155

M

180

2339

Nicholas156

M

180

2339

Christian, Dayne Atani157

M

96

2339

Rovinski,

143. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Farrokh, 1:16-mj-24 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 15, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
144. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Jalloh, 1:16-mj-296 (E.D. Va.
July 3, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
145. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Khan, H15-712m (N.D. Ill. Oct.
6, 2014); The Cases, supra note 108.
146. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Lutchman, 15-mj-4212 (W.D.
N.Y. Dec. 30, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
147. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ahmed, supra note 142; The
Cases, supra note 108.
148. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Natsheh, CR 16 166 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
149. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Qamar, 1:16mj-300 (E.D. Va.
July 7, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
150. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Sayyed, DC17-3663 (D. Ala. June
15, 2017); The Cases, supra note 108.
151. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Teausant, 2:14-mj-0064 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2014); The Cases, supra note 108.
152. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Thomas, 15-417-m (E.D. Pa. Apr.
3, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
153. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Elshinawy, 15-2716 TJS (D. Md.
Dec. 11, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
154. Indictment, United States v. Hardan, 16 CR 003 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6,
2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
155. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Saadeh, 15-7200 (CLW) (D. N.J.
Aug. 1, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
156. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Wright, 15-10153-WGY (D.
Mass. Apr. 21, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
157. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hubbard, 16-3010-CMM (S.D.
Fla. July 22, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
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Hubbard, Gregory158

M

144

2339

Amri, Soufian159

M

24

1001

McCain, Marchello Dsaun160

M

120

1001

McCollum, Robert161

M

192

2339

Ramic, Jasminka162

F

36

2339

Elfgeeh, Mufid163

M

270

2339

Mohamed164

M

132

2339

Abdurahman, Zacharia Yusuf165

M

120

2339

Topaz, Samuel Rahamin166

M

96

2339

Van Haften, Joshua Ray167

M

120

2339

Warsame, Abdirizak168

M

30

2339

Williams, Lionel Nelson169

M

240

2339

Wolfe, Michael Todd170

M

82

2339

Yassin, Safya Roe171

F

108

2339

Delshaun172

F

144

2339

Elhassan, Mahmoud Amin

Young, Jaelyn

158. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hubbard, supra note 157; The
Cases, supra note 108.
159. Amri Indictment, supra note 126; The Cases, supra note 108.
160. Indictment, United States v. McCain, 15CR0174W (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
161. Indictment, United States v. Al-Ghazi, 1:15 CR 268 (E.D. Ohio July 16,
2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
162. Indictment, United States v. Hodzic, 4:15CR00049 CDP/DDN (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 5, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
163. Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the Search of
WhatsApp Messenger, 14-MJ-635 (W.D. N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014); The Cases, supra
note 108.
164. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Elhassan, 1:16-mj-25 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Elhassan Complaint]; The Cases, supra note 108.
165. Ahmed Superseding Indictment, supra note 142; The Cases, supra note
108.
166. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Topaz, 15-7189 (CLW) (D. N.J.
June 18, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
167. Complaint for Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B,
United States v. Haften, 14-mj-130 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2014); The Cases, supra
note 108.
168. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Warsame, 15-mj-978 HB (D.
Minn. Dec. 9, 2015); The Cases, supra note 108.
169. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Williams, 2:17cr1 (E.D. Va.
July 6, 2017); The Cases, supra note 108.
170. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Wolfe, A-14-M-288 (W.D. Tex.
June 18, 2014); The Cases, supra note 108.
171. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Yassin, 16-mj-2009 DPR (W.D.
Mo. Feb. 17, 2016); The Cases, supra note 108.
172. Young Complaint, supra note 137; The Cases, supra note 108.
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Yusuf, Abdullahi173

M

22

2339

Raishani, Saddam174

M

240

2339

B. Data Analysis
Although the data
set is rather skewed
due to the greater
number of males in
the set, it is crucial
to note that the
disparities
in
sentencing are stark,
even
when
comparing males and
females
who
committed
similar
crimes. The average
sentence for females
was 49.5 months for
18 U.S.C. § 1001
offenses. The average
sentence for males
was 87.2 months for
18 U.S.C. § 1001
offenses. The total
average disparity is
34.7 months. The
average sentence for
females for §2339
offenses
is
86.4
months. The average
sentence for males
under §2339 is 155.2 months. The total average disparity is 68.8
months.
Graph: Visualizing Sentencing
Averages Based on Sex and Charge

C. Narratives
After the analysis was completed, several descriptions
surrounding the women demonstrated the prevalence of framing
narratives within the legal field when it comes to female terrorists.
In particular, three primary narratives come to light when
173. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Yusuf, 14-MJ-1024 (JSM) (D.
Minn. Nov. 24, 2014); The Cases, supra note 108.
174. Complaint, United States v. Raishani, 17-MAG-4763 (S.D. N.Y. June
22, 2017) [hereinafter Raishani Complaint]; The Cases, supra note 108.
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examining the rhetoric: infantilization, reliance on male ISIS
members, and parental responsibilities.
1. Infantilization
First, women who commit terrorism offenses are often
infantilized. Infantilization refers to the practice of comparing
women to children.175 According to sociological research, the term
“girl” evokes a “cutesy, submissive quality, whereas ‘woman’ seems
to embody responsibility and independence.”176 The effect of
infantilization denies the female offenders’ autonomy for their
actions.177 Instead, the rhetoric surrounding the offenses invokes a
conception of an immature, rash individual, rather than one who is
able to understand the consequences of her actions.178
2. Reliance on Male ISIS members
Second, the women are described as being motivated by
nothing more than a search for love, or a desire to end their
isolation. Much like the infantilization discussed previously, the
representation of females as naïve strips them of their autonomy.
As noted earlier, there is a common misperception that women who
join ISIS are motivated “only by love and marriage.”179 Essentially,
this means that they are perceived as “victims in need of protection
rather than aggressors to be punished,” because the women are
framed as being duped by a smooth-talking male terrorist.180
Additionally, this has the effect of making the female offenders
appear non-threatening or less likely to commit violence in the

175. Robin Lakoff, Language, Gender, and Politics: Putting “Women” and
“Power” in the Same Sentence, in HANDBOOK LANGUAGE & GENDER 161, 173
(Janet Holmes & Miriam Meyerhof eds., 2003). Women are often compared to
“children and airheads, interested not in issues but in clothes, sex, and childish
things.” Id.
176. Chelsae R. Huot, Language as a Social Reality: The Effects of the
Infantilization of Women, 72 ELECTRONIC THESES & DISSERTATIONS 1, 40
(2013).
177. See Brown, supra note 84, at 170 (describing the effect of Muriel
Degaugue’s infantilization by the media).
178. Hout, supra note 176, at 44 (addressing the fact that “[t]he term ‘girl’
reminded people of youth and immaturity, whereas ‘woman’ reminded people of
an older, mature adult”).
179. Jamie Grierson, Isis Women Driven by More than Marriage, Research
Shows, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2019), www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/nov/
03/isis-women-driven-by-more-than-marriage-research-shows (describing a
recent guidance compiled by the counter-extremist think tank, the Institute for
Strategic Dialogue, on the motivations of female terrorists).
180. Rachael E. Collins, ‘Beauty and Bullets’: A Content Analysis of Female
Offenders and Victims in Four Canadian Newspapers, 52 J. SOC. 296, 298
(2014).
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future than their male counterparts.181 This portrayal is also
exacerbated by the dramatized representation of women as “jihadi
brides” or “black widows” in the media.182 By depicting women as
being duped by their lovers, the Western news significantly
undercuts the participation of these women. In turn, “the policies
that many Western governments and judicial institutions pursue
impress upon the public that migration is not a choice Western
woman would voluntarily make.”183 The narrative that women are
pawns of men frequently denies their agency and undermines the
consequences of their actions.184
3. Parental Responsibilities
The third common framing device is that of parental
responsibilities—or the abandonment of those responsibilities.
Parental responsibilities are often seen among the most important
roles of a woman in society, so much so that motherhood becomes
an “enforced identity and political institution.”185 Interestingly,
“[m]otherhood, like sexuality, plays a critical role in women’s
subordination,” in society, because mothers are expected to be
completely selfless.186
Generally, parental responsibilities impact sentencing in two
main ways. First, courts are “reluctant to deprive children of a
provider or caregiver.”187 Second, and in contrast, the criminal
justice system often punishes women who “deviate from appropriate
female behavior.”188 This is particularly relevant because women
are often expected to be nurturing and non-violent.189
Overall, the combination of these narratives disparagingly
contribute to the relative lack of consequences for women who
commit terrorism crimes. Not only do the narratives undermine the
criminal justice system due to their propensity to decrease the
181. Id. at 307.
182. Mia Bloom, Bombshells: Women and Terrorism, 28 GENDER ISSUES 1
(2011); Maura Conway & Lisa McInerney, What’s Love Got to Do With it?
Framing ‘JihadJane’ in the US Press, 5 MEDIA, WAR, & CONFLICT 6 (2012).
183. Meredith Loken & Anna Zelenz, Explaining Extremism: Western
Women in Daesh, 3 EUR. J. INT’L SECURITY 45, 49 (2017).
184. See Nacos, supra note 4 (describing the media’s portrayal of Degauque).
185. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 96-97
(1993).
186. Id. at 96-103; see also Brittnie Aiello & Krista McQueeney, “How Can
You Live Without Your Kids?”: Distancing from and Embracing the Stigma of
“Incarcerated Mother,” 3 J. PRISON EDUC. & REENTRY 32, 34 (2016) (explaining
the concept of “intensive mothering,” which describes the “impossible
expectations placed on mothers.” The demands placed on mothers include being
“personally selfless, financially expensive, and emotionally consuming
caregiving”).
187. Roberts, supra note 185, at 105.
188. Id. at 107.
189. Sixta, supra note 81.
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agency of a large sub-set of offenders, the disparities also create a
flaw in counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts.

D. Individual Profiles
In order to identify why sentences for females who committed
the same exact crimes as males are lower, the rhetoric of the legal
professionals involved in these cases must be examined. This is
because the motives and reasoning behind the sentence can only be
determined by analyzing the rationale mentioned by the
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges who were assigned to the
case.
In order to gain this understanding, documents and statements
made by the legal professionals were analyzed for four of the
women—Heather Elizabeth Coffman, Daniela Greene, Shannon
Maureen Conley, and Keonna Thomas. These women were chosen
based on the accessibility of the aforementioned statements.
Additionally, men with similar charges were also analyzed
alongside the women, specifically Mahmoud Amin Mohamed
Elhassan, Ikaika Erik Kang, Hamza Naj Ahmed, and Saddam
Raishani. These men were chosen based on their cases’ factual
similarities to the female offenders’ cases.
This section will explore the cases individually, then it will
discuss the sentencing disparities between the pairs. In the
discussion of sentencing disparities, this section will also provide
insight into which narratives played a role in the sentences of the
individuals.
1. Comparison: Heather Coffman & Mahmoud Amin
Mohamed Elhassan
a. Heather Coffman
Heather Elizabeth Coffman was a thirty-year-old Virginia
resident who was charged with making false statements.190 She
caught the eye of agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) when she began posting pro-ISIS messages on her Facebook
account.191 When an undercover agent made contact with her,
Coffman “indicated that she had legitimate ISIS facilitator contacts,
capable of arranging for training and entry into Syria to join the
190. Coffman Criminal Complaint, supra note 120, at 2; Defendant’s
Position on Sentencing at 6, United States v. Coffman, 3:15-cr-00016-JAG (E.D.
Va. Apr. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Coffman Defendant’s Position on Sentencing].
191. Coffman Criminal Complaint, supra note 120, at 3-4 (for example,
Coffman posted “two images with the word ‘WE ARE ALL ISIS, ISLAMIC
STATE OF IRAQ & SHAM’” on June 23, 2014 and when asked about the proISIS photos on her page by another Facebook user, she responded “I love ISIS!”).
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ISIS cause.”192 She then offered to share her contact’s information
with the undercover agent.193 The criminal complaint also focused
on her relationship with “N.A.,” a man that she claimed to be
married to.194 On November 13, 2014, Coffman was caught lying to
FBI agents about her communications with the undercover agent.195
Coffman’s defense attorney, Mary E. Maguire, made the
argument that “it is evident from a review of her childhood that she
embraced various trends and that she has always been attracted to
‘bad-boys.’”196 Maguire explained that the “love” Coffman felt for
N.A. and “her efforts to support and please” him explained why she
protected N.A. by making false statements to the federal agents.197
Coffman, according to her defense attorney, was “isolated from the
‘real world’” due to her social media and video game habits; she was
in search of “a genuine friend.”198 Perhaps most striking was
Maguire’s description that “the essence of this crime reflects a
young, naïve woman who got caught up in a cause and acted and
spoke without appreciating the seriousness of her actions.”199
Maguire elaborated that Coffman “became obsessed with ISIS like
she had become obsessed with the preppy and goth trends.”200 At
sentencing, Maguire stated her argument clearly: “I think she never
understood the gravity of what she was doing until it was too
late.”201
Likewise, prosecutors implied that while Coffman was hardly
a casual ISIS supporter,202 her primary motivation, at least in the
192. Id. at 7.
193. Id. at 8.
194. Id. at 5 (noting that “[o]n July 25, 2014 a confederate referred to
hereafter as N.A., with whom Coffman claimed to be married to, posted that he
hoped their future son would be ‘Mujaheeden.’ COFFMAN said that this son
would ‘go with’ N.A. and that COFFMAN supports N.A. ‘whutever you want to
do’”).
195. Id. at 10 (specifying that “COFFMAN was asked whether UC supported
ISIS or Al-Qaeda. COFFMAN told the FBI special agents ‘We don’t talk about
things like that’” among other false statements).
196. Coffman Defendant’s Position on Sentencing, supra note 190, at 6.
197. Id. at 8-9 (explaining that for Coffman and N.A. the common interest
in joining ISIS “meant they were in love . . . In her efforts to support and please
the man she thought would one day be her husband, Ms. Coffman sent
approximately $1,500 to N.A. for personal and family expenses, which depleted
her financially”).
198. Id. at 6.
199. Id. at 9.
200. Id. at 9.
201. Frank Green, Henrico Woman, Ex-ISIS Supporter, Sentenced for Lying
to FBI, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 11, 2015), www.richmond.com/news/
local/crime/henrico-woman-ex-isis-supporter-sentenced-for-lying-tofbi/article_a79fcb93-ecdd-5547-84a8-11b095bbe207.html.
202. Position of the United States on Sentencing, United States v. Coffman,
3:15-cr-00016-JAG at 3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Coffman Position
of the United States on Sentencing] (arguing, “[t]he defendant’s online activities
were neither casual nor infrequent. Her online presence was significant. She
had at least 10 separate Facebook accounts with male and female pseudonyms
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beginning, was her lust for N.A.203 The government emphasized
that Coffman’s “online activities were not mere fantasy or roleplaying,” and that she was trying to lend support to ISIS through
her “online, romantic relationship.”204 In its sentencing
memorandum, the government also noted that Coffman “has a
seven year-old son from a prior relationship” but that her mental
health was concerning.205 Due to her cooperation, the government
requested a sentence of 57 months.206
During sentencing, Judge John A. Gibney chastised Coffman
for lying, stating “her lies were just as blatant and as two-faced as
you can imagine,” before expressing his hope that she “has learned
her lesson from this.”207 He also stated that her lies were “not like
lying to your parents about who broke the lamp.”208 In the end,
Coffman was sentenced to fifty-four months imprisonment for her
false statements.209
Notably, upon her release, Coffman quickly took up social
media again.210 Her first post was, “I’m home.”211 This was later
followed up by several images and messages — some identified as
ISIS propaganda — which advocated for women to dress more
conservatively.212
b. Mahmoud Amin Mohamed Elhassan
Mahmoud Amin Mohamen Elhassan was a twenty-five-yearold resident of Virginia when he was arrested and charged with
providing material support.213 Elhassan first caught the attention
of the FBI when he began corresponding with a confidential
informant who he believed was connected with ISIS.214 Elhassan

and each time Facebook terminated an account for violating the terms of
service, she created a new one”).
203. Id. at 5 (explaining how Coffman engaged in a romantic relationship
with N.A., an ISIS militant, convinced his family to approve of his plans to be a
martyr, and facilitated his travels to Syria until he backed out).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 11.
207. Green, supra note 201.
208. Virginia Woman Sentenced for Lying about ISIS Bomb Plot, CBS (May
11, 2015), www.cbsnews.com/news/virginia-woman-sentenced-for-lying-aboutisis-bomb-plot/.
209. The Cases, supra note 108.
210. Jessica Donati, U.S. Prisons Allow Extremism to Fester, Study Warns,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2018), www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prisons-allow-extremismto-fester-study-warns-1517930107.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Elhassan Complaint, supra note 164, at 3.
214. Id. at 4 (noting that Elhassan began corresponding with the
confidential informant in August 2015 and that the conversations were
corroborated by “electronic and other means”).
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was searching for someone to help his friend travel to Syria.215
Elhassan stated that he knew that his friend was intending to join
ISIS.216 When FBI agents confronted him, Elhassan told them that
his friend was going to California to attend a funeral and would be
gone for two weeks.217 He was eventually sentenced to 132-months
imprisonment.218
During a court hearing, United States Magistrate Judge Ivan
D. Davis referred to Elhassan as someone who exhibited a “complete
lack of honesty.”219 To the same point, the government stated in its
sentencing memorandum that Elhassan “chose allegiance to the
Islamic State cause over allegiance to the truth.”220 In describing
him, the government invoked imagery of other terrorist attacks by
pointing out the U.S. “has seen firsthand the horrific carnage
wrought by ‘lone wolf’ criminals acting in the name of Islamic
terrorism.”221 This statement fits with the government’s
characterization that Elhassan’s “pattern of criminal, anti-social
activity” demonstrates that he “has no respect for the rule of law.”222
In contrast to the government, Elhassan’s attorneys, Thomas
Durkin and Stuart Spears, focused on the “extraordinary emotional
upheaval” Elhassan faced to explain why he was “was drawn in his
crisis and despair to ISI[S]’s simplistic credo.”223 In particular, the
attorneys argued that his abusive upbringing—and resulting
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder—shaped Elhassan’s
worldview, culminating in the “terribly misguided decision.”224 In
215. Id. (describing that specifically, Elhassan was searching for someone to
help his friend get to “Dawlah”—which referred to ISIS).
216. Id. at 10 (explaining that “Elhassan knew of Farrokh’s plans to travel
to Syria to join ISIL. Elhassan made statements acknowledging that Farrokh
was falsely telling his family that he intended to travel to Saudi Arabia to
study”).
217. Id. at 12 (explaining that “Elhassan verbally acknowledged to the
interviewing agents more than once that he knew it was illegal to knowingly lie
to federal agents. He then proceeded to make a number of false statements in
response to the agents’ questions”).
218. The Cases, supra note 108.
219. Matt Zapotosky, Judge Threatens To Jail Lawyer For Va. Man Accused
In Friend’s Bid To Join ISIS, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-threatens-to-jail-lawyer-athearing-for-virginia-man-accused-in-plot-to-help-friend-joinisis/2016/01/27/3afe1ef0-c524-11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html (clarifying
that the magistrate judge concluded, “that while Elhassan might not be a
danger to the community, he had demonstrated a ‘complete lack of honesty’ and
was a risk not to show up at future court hearings”).
220. United States’ Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, United States v.
Elhassan, 1:16cr00064 (AJT) at 20 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2017) [hereinafter
Elhassan Government Sentencing Memorandum].
221. Id. at 2.
222. Id. at 5.
223. Defendant’s Position Paper & Commentary on Sentencing Factors,
United States v. Elhassan, 1:16-cr-00064 at 14 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2017)
[hereinafter Elhassan Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum].
224. Id. at 2-8.
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response to the stress of his youth, Elhassan turned to the “faith
community [which] provided Mr. Elhassan with a much needed
sense of purpose and comradery,” but that did nothing to “resolve
his increasingly severe depression,” according to the attorneys.225 In
sum, the defense attorneys, like Coffman’s attorney, emphasized
Elhassan’s isolation and desperation for understanding.226
c.

Sentence Comparison

It is important to note the similarities between Coffman and
Elhassan. Both were facilitating their friends’ travels, and both
made false statements to federal agents. Neither made any
attempts to travel on their own. However, Elhassan was charged
with the crime of material support and received over double the
sentence that Coffman received. The resulting disparity is seventyeight months, or six and a half years.
One factor behind this disparity could be the role of the
infantilization narrative. Coffman was described as “young” and her
attorney made several remarks about how she acted like a teenager
in that she was looking for a new “trend” to follow.227 Her attorney
also emphasized that Coffman did not seem to understand the
seriousness of her actions.228 The judge even compared her case to
children lying to their parents.229 The effect of this infantilization is
that Coffman is portrayed as immature and childlike, someone who
cannot appreciate the consequences of her actions.
The infantilizing effect is evident when compared to her
counterpart, Mahmoud Elhassan. Often, his case was described
using violent imagery and comparisons to other deadly attacks.230
More importantly, he was described as someone who “chose
allegiance to the Islamic State cause over allegiance to the truth.”231
In stark contrast to Coffman, Elhassan’s actions were a choice
rather than a product of immaturity. In other words, Elhassan was
given more autonomy and responsibility over his actions.
In this light, the additional six-and-a-half-year sentence
disparity is understandable because his “adult” choices are more
serious than those of Coffman, who is treated as though she simply
does not know any better. This infantilizing rhetoric does nothing
but detract from the agency of Coffman.
The theme of searching for a relationship appears frequently
in the rhetoric used in the cases of women. Coffman was framed as
a lovesick girl who was attracted to “bad boys,” but her habits made
225. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Coffman Defendant’s Position on Sentencing, supra note 190, at 6-9.
228. Green, supra note 201.
229. Id.
230. Elhassan Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 220, at 2.
231. Id. at 20.
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her “isolated from the ‘real world.’”232 This seemingly led to her
willingness to play a supportive role for N.A., with whom she was
romantically involved.233 Later, her isolation made her help the
undercover FBI agent because she was in search of a “genuine
friend.”234 The isolation, in other words, operated as a scapegoat for
her actions.
Interestingly, a variant of this narrative appeared in
Elhassan’s framing, when it was argued that his faith community
seemed to give him “a much-needed sense of purpose and
comradery,” as a way of showing that he had positive relationships
in his life. 235 On the other hand, however, the government
countered this assertion by pointing out his isolation, or “anti-social
activity,” as evidence of his dangerous character.236 In fact, the
isolation added to the government’s earlier invocation of lone wolf
attacks on American soil.237
Unwittingly, the framing of women as being reliant on males
appears to provide a significant strategic advantage for female
terrorists. By the very virtue of being woman, the female terrorists
are subject to much less scrutiny.238 Because they are unassuming
and arouse less suspicion than males, women are easily able to
smuggle weapons to a terrorist group or conceal bombs during a
suicide attack.239 More than that, it allows female offenders the
opportunity to recidivate without much scrutiny — as demonstrated
by Coffman’s post-imprisonment Facebook posts.240
2. Comparison: Daniela Greene & Ikaika Erik Kang
a. Daniela Greene
Daniela Greene was a married FBI contract linguist from
Czechoslovakia working in Detroit in 2014.241 She was thirty-eight
years old and fluent in German.242 Her mission was to investigate

232. Coffman Defendant’s Position on Sentencing, supra note 190, at 6-9.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 6.
235. Elhassan Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 223.
236. Elhassan Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 220, at 5.
237. Id. at 2.
238. Nacos, supra note 4.
239. Sixta, supra note 81; Deborah M. Galvin, The Female Terrorist: A SocioPsychological Perspective, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 19 (1983).
240. Donati, supra note 210.
241. FBI Woman Went To Syria To Wed IS Recruiter She Investigated, BBC
(May 2, 2017), www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39783511; Affidavit in
Support of Criminal Complaint, United States v. Greene, 1:14-cr-00230-RC at 4
(2015) [hereinafter Greene Supporting Affidavit].
242. FBI Woman Went To Syria To Wed IS Recruiter She Investigated, supra
note 241.
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German rapper and ISIS recruiter, Denis Cuspert.243 Cuspert had
appeared in at least one ISIS propaganda video holding a “freshly
decapitated human head.”244 About six months later, Greene went
to Syria to marry him.245 She ultimately lied to FBI agents about
where she was traveling to and told Cuspert that he was the subject
of an FBI investigation.246 Shortly thereafter, Greene got cold feet
and decided to return to the U.S.247 She was charged with making
false statements and was sentenced to twenty-four months
imprisonment.248
As one reporter noted, the “Justice Department prosecutors…
charged her with a relatively minor offense, then asked a judge to
give her a reduced sentence in exchange for her cooperation,”
despite the national security threat that Greene’s actions posed.249
Her defense attorney, Shawn Moore, described Greene as “smart,
articulate and obviously naïve.”250 He followed that statement up by
saying that "[s]he was just a well-meaning person that got up in
something way over her head."251 The government, in its sentencing
memorandum, described how “[h]er escape from the area
unscathed, and with much of [her national security knowledge]
undisclosed, appears to be a stroke of luck or measure of the lack of
savvy on the part of the terrorists with whom she interacted.”252
b. Ikaika Erik Kang
Before he was charged with providing material support to a
terrorist organization, Ikaika Erik Kang was a Sergeant First Class
in the United States Army.253 He was charged with providing
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Scott Glover, The FBI Translator Who Went Rogue and Married An
ISIS Terrorist, CNN (May 1, 2017), www.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/
investigates-fbi-syria-greene/index.html; Greene Supporting Affidavit, supra
note 241, at 4 (explaining, “GREENE told her FBI supervisor and the Chief
Security Officer at the Indianapolis Division of the FBI that she intended to
travel to Germany to see her family on June 21, 2014”).
247. Greene Supporting Affidavit, supra note 241, at 6. Greene wrote,
“[s]ometimes I wish I could just come back I wouldn’t even know how to make
it through if I tried to come back.” Id.
248. The Cases, supra note 108.
249. Glover, supra note 246.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Government’s Motion for Departure and Memorandum in Aid of
Sentencing, United States v. Greene, 14-CR-230 at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Greene Government’s Sentencing Memorandum]. Ultimately, the
government recommended that Greene should get a downward departure from
the maximum sentence. Id.
253. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, United States v. Kang,
Mag. No. 17-00767 KJM at 4 (D. Haw. July 10, 2017) [hereinafter Kang
Supporting Affidavit]. Kang was “a trained air traffic controller and his career
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material support to ISIS.254 He provided “classified… and other
sensitive but unclassified military documents” to someone he
believed was member of ISIS, purchased a drone to be used by ISIS,
trained a purported ISIS member in combat, and videotaped the
training so it could be disseminated to other ISIS members.255
Although he expressed interest in traveling to the ISIS consulate in
Turkey, he never did so because he feared being arrested.256
Nevertheless, the documents he provided assisted ISIS fighters in
combat techniques.257 Ultimately, Kang did plead guilty to the
offense.258 Kang was sentenced to 300-months imprisonment.259
Turning to the narratives surrounding Kang, Assistant
Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers stated,
“Kang swore to defend the United States as a member of our
military, but betrayed his country by swearing allegiance to ISIS
and attempting to provide material support to the foreign terrorist
organization.”260 Meanwhile, his defense attorney, Birney Bervar
stated, “[i]t would appear that Sgt. Kang, a decorated veteran of two
deployments to the Middle East, may suffer from service-related
mental health issues, which the government was aware of but
neglected to treat.”261

field within the military, known as a Military Operational Specialty, [was] 15Q Air Traffic Control Operator.” Id. Additionally, Kang had “achieved ‘Level IV
Tactical Combat Instructor’ status,” giving him “the ability to serve as an
instructor in combatives to other soldiers.” Id.
254. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Kang, Mag. No. 17-00767 KJM 1
(D. Haw. July 10, 2017) [hereinafter Kang Criminal Complaint].
255. Kang Supporting Affidavit, supra note 253, at 5 (noting that the
documents would “assist ISIS, including with fighting and military tactics” and
that Kang “mentioned repeatedly through the investigation to multiple persons
that he wanted to provide training for ISIS fighters”).
256. Id. at 9. Kang revealed this to undercover FBI agents during a training
course. Id.
257. Id. at 15. Specifically, Kang aimed to help ISIS fighters by teaching
them “how to ‘react to contact’ and communicate” while fighting.” Id.
258. The Cases, supra note 108.
259. U.S. Soldier Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Attempting to Provide
Material Support for ISIS, DEP’T JUSTICE (Dec. 4, 2018), www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/us-soldier-sentenced-25-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-supportisis. Kang’s sentence is not included in the dataset because the sentencing
hearing occurred after this comment was initially written. Because of the
unique similarities between his case and Greene’s, however, the profile was
included.
260. Kate Sullivan, US Soldier Pleads Guilty To Attempting To Provide
Support To ISIS, CNN (Aug. 29, 2018), www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/politics/ussoldier-guilty-plea-isis-support/index.html (describing Demer’s statement in
regards to the plea deal that was struck).
261. HNN Staff, Hawaii Soldier Remains in Federal Custody, Accused of
Trying
to
Help
ISIS,
HAW. NEWS NOW
(Aug.
10,
2017),
www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/35850537/hawaii-soldier-arrested-for-allegedties-to-terrorist-group/ (identifying a variety of reactions from family members,
friends, and Bervar to the charges against Kang).
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Sentence Comparison

Like Greene, Kang had access to, and revealed, classified
materials to actual or purported ISIS fighters. A major difference
between the two, however, is the fact that prosecutors believed that
Greene displayed remorse or regret after traveling to ISIS territory.
Still, Greene was only charged with making false statements rather
than providing material support. Ultimately this resulted in a
sentencing disparity of 276 months, or twenty-three years.
Just like the infantilization narrative in Coffman’s case, the
infantilizing rhetoric also detracts from the education and skill of
Greene. To illustrate, when Greene was arrested she was thirtyeight, working as a linguist for the FBI, and fluent in German—she
was clearly intelligent.262 However, she was described as “obviously
naïve.”263 Her attorney characterized her as “in over her head,”
much like the younger Coffman.264 This culminated in the framing
of her escape from ISIS as merely “a stroke of luck.”265 The reliance
narrative, too, appeared in Greene’s case; Greene’s attraction to
Cuspert266 was used as evidence of the aforementioned apparent
naivety.
Meanwhile, Kang was admonished by prosecutors for singlehandedly jeopardizing national security.267 His act was a “betrayal”
to his whole country because of his status as a military member.268
The rhetoric employed by the attorneys in Greene’s case may lead a
reader to believe that she did not make much of a choice to join ISIS
at all; that she just ended up there through happenstance and made
it out because of “luck.” Moreover, the narrative used by her
attorneys did not mention her experience or training. Likewise, the
rhetoric used in Kang’s case makes him appear to be a bigger threat
than Greene. It also applies a more political motive to his actions
because he is seen as making a conscious, and well-thought out
choice.
While the reliance rhetoric is not prominent for male offenders,
the mental health narrative is often discussed. This framing
strategy provides a motive for extremists’ actions in a way that may
oversimplify the case, while placing the blame on the offender for
not seeking mental health treatment.269 In contrast, the focus on
262. FBI Woman Went To Syria To Wed IS Recruiter She Investigated, supra
note 212.
263. Id.
264. Glover, supra note 246.
265. Greene Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 252.
266. Glover, supra note 246.
267. Sullivan, supra note 260.
268. Id.
269. See Jaime Ducharme, Stop Blaming School Shootings on Mental
Illness, Top Psychologist Warns, TIME (Feb. 16, 2018), www.time.com/
5162927/mass-shootings-mental-health-apa/ (citing a warning from American
Psychological Association President Jessica Henderson Daniel that blaming
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intelligence and naiveté for female extremists is more like a
personality trait that cannot be changed. The mental health
narrative was prominent in Kang’s case in that his “service-related
mental health issues” were offered as an explanation for his
behavior.270 The difference between the two narratives is that
mental health issues are viewed as diagnosable and treatable, while
loneliness is framed as a ploy for attention.
3. Comparison: Shannon Maureen Conley & Hamza Naj
Ahmed
a. Shannon Maureen Conley
Shannon Conley was twenty-three years old when she tried to
leave Colorado to join ISIS.271 She was a Certified Nurse’s Assistant
and aspired to become a nurse for those fighting the Jihad.272
During an interview with FBI agents, Conley “stated that if she is
not allowed to fight because she is a woman, she will use her medical
training to aid Jihadi fighters . . . . If she cannot fight or be a nurse
for Jihad, Conley stated she will assist Jihadi fighters in whatever
manner is needed.”273 Conley had met a suitor online — a thirtytwo-year-old Tunisian man who she planned to marry in Syria.274
In furtherance of that plan, she booked a flight to Turkey on April
8, 2014 and planned to cross over to Syria through Turkey.275 She
described this plan to covert FBI agents and stated that nothing
would change her mind.276 Conley was arrested on April 8, 2014 at
instances of violence on mental conditions may “oversimplify the issue of mass
violence and stigmatize those struggling with mental health issues”); Rachel
Nuwer, Is There a Link Between Mass Shootings and Mental Illness?, BBC (May
10, 2018), www.bbc.com/future/story/20180509-is-there-a-link-between-massshooting-and-mental-illness (quoting Professor Renee Binder as saying, “while
something is clearly wrong with [perpetrators of violence], it’s often not a
serious mental illness”).
270. See HNN Staff, supra note 261 (describing Kang’s potential mental
health issues).
271. Trial and Terror: Shannon Maureen Conley, INTERCEPT (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018), trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/people/0ce778e7-c4fe-463896d5-abad3cd5a142.
272. Conley Criminal Complaint, supra note 136, at 4.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 10 (elaborating that “[the suitor] is a 32-year-old Tunisian male…
Conley told [her father] that [the suitor] claimed to be in Syria fighting on behalf
of “ISIS.” … Conley and [the suitor] asked for [her father]’s blessing for Conley
and [the suitor] to marry and for [her father] to send Conley to Syria to marry
[the suitor] as soon as possible. [Her father] declined both requests, which
appeared to surprise both Conley and [the suitor]”).
275. Id. at 9.
276. Id. at 8-9 (first describing that “Conley stated that she was aware that
her plans were potentially illegal and she could possibly get arrested, and
therefore she has no intention to return to the US.” Later adding that her
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the airport in Denver “as she walked down the jet way to board the
flight.”277 She was charged with providing material support and
sentenced to forty-eight months imprisonment.278
Perhaps the most striking comments made about Conley came
from the judge himself. During her sentencing, Judge Raymond P.
Moore noted that she “has no history in the criminal justice system.
She is very young . . . . Teenagers make dumb decisions a lot.”279
Those factors, and her propensity to consider “marrying somebody
that [she] only met on the internet,” led Judge Moore to state that
“this is a history of events that would make for a bad movie.”280 The
judge characterized Conley as a “bit of a mess” and described her as
a “look at me girl” who is “drawn to attention” and just “doesn’t get
it.”281
Her defense attorney, Robert W. Pepin, emphasized her youth
in the Motion for Release on Bond.282 He argued to the court that,
Ms. Conley has been thoroughly humbled. Before her arrest the
possibility of incarceration for committing the offense to which she
has pleaded guilty was no more than a vague notion in the life of an
18 year old eager to be married . . . . Now, she has… borne the
frustration and indignities experienced by every prisoner, and had
every single facet of her life controlled twenty four hours a day.283

During her sentencing hearing, attorney Pepin also compared her
to his nineteen-year-old daughter in the context of telling her to
control her frustrations after she “kind of gave a little hissy” when
she discussed an issue with the Assistant U.S. Attorney on her
case.284 Later, he also advocated for an alternative to prison because
of her history of being vulnerable and “susceptible to influences of

parents “were advised their daughter had expressed, to overt FBI agents, her
intention to travel overseas and commit violent Jihad”).
277. Id. at 11.
278. The Cases, supra note 108.
279. Michael Martinez et al., Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to
Join ISIS, CNN (Jan. 24, 2015), www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-womanisis-sentencing/.
280. Reporter’s Transcript: Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Conley,
14-cr-163 at 33 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Conley Sentencing Hearing]
(noting that her time at a teen police academy contrasts with the events leading
to her arrest and that clearly Conley “is in need of psychiatric help”).
281. Id. at 66-68; Martinez, et al., supra note 279. Later, the Judge also
described her as being “attracted to attention like a moth to flame.” Conley
Sentencing Hearing, supra note 280, at 70-71. He also asserts that the
psychologists and psychiatrist also agree with that characterization. Id. This
discussion came after he expressed concern that her disavowel of ISIS after her
arrest was disingenuous because of its timing and her continued support for the
man she met online and “knew for maybe a month or two on skype.” Id. at 6073.
282. Motion for Release on Bond, United States v. Conley, 14-cr-00163-RM
(D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Conley Bond Motion].
283. Id. at 4.
284. Conley Sentencing Hearing, supra note 280, at 54.
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whatever flavor.”285
Assistant U.S. Attorney Gregory Holloway began his
discussion of Conley’s crime by telling the court, “this is a first for
me, in doing a case where a defendant, essentially, forced us to
arrest [her]” by ignoring the government’s warnings.286 Holloway
consistently emphasized that, “on the one hand, she is engaging and
intelligent, and on the other . . . the best way I can describe it is
pathologically naïve. The idea that she would go over to Syria and
it would be all moonbeams and gumdrops is—is absurd.”287
In imposing her sentence, Judge Moore told her: “I know that
you are young. I know that you are naïve. I know that you are
uncomfortable with yourself,” but told her that he was still
concerned with the seriousness of her support for ISIS and the
potential danger she poses.288 The Judge concluded by stating: “I
have to send a message that deters others.”289
b. Hamza Naj Ahmed
Hamza Naj Ahmed, nineteen, was slightly younger than
Conley at the time of his offense.290 Ahmed was initially charged
with making a false statement,291 but ultimately was sentenced for
providing material support and received a sentence of 180-months
imprisonment.292 His sentence was reduced to ten years due to
issues surrounding his plea agreement.293 Ahmed, along with six
285. Id. at 87 (arguing that the best way to ensure that she does not attempt
to commit the same crime again in the future is to focus on her mental health).
286. Id. at 23.
287. Id. at 39.
288. Id. at 102.
289. Id. at 105.
290. U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Minn., Three More Twin Cities Men
Sentenced for Providing Material Support to ISIL: Six Co-conspirators Have
Been Sentenced, DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 15, 2016), www.justice.gov/usaomn/pr/three-more-twin-cities-men-sentenced-providing-material-support-isil
[hereinafter USAO, Dist. of Minn.].
291. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Ahmed, 15-mj-95(SER) 1 (2015)
[hereinafter Ahmed Criminal Complaint].
292. USAO, Dist. of Minn., supra note 290.
293. Second Declaration in Support of Motion to Amend/Correct for
Concurrent Sentencing, United States v. Ahmed, 15-CR-49 (MJD/FLN) at 1 (D.
Minn. Nov. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Ahmed Second Declaration in Support]
(explaining that the defense attorney, JaneAnne Murray, “was unaware of
several of the issues… including the circumstances surrounding Ms. Fathia’s
direction to Mr. Ahmed to reject the initial plea offer, as well as the information
reported in the Star Tribune that Hassan Jami was providing financial support
to the families of the defendants”); Laura Yuen, Here’s Why Judge Cut
Minnesota ISIS Defendant’s Sentence, MPR NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016),
www.mprnews.org/story/2016/11/30/minnesota-isis-hamza-ahmed-reducedsentence-explained (noting, “Kenneth Udoibok, an attorney representing Adnan
Farah, said he believes [Hassan] Mohamud,” an imam representing another coconspirator, “influenced at least three families in an effort to dissuade their sons
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other young males, attempted to travel to Syria to join ISIS.294
Ahmed denied knowing all of the other travelers.295 His Twitter
account and surveillance videos, however, directly contradicted that
assertion.296
Ahmed’s defense attorney, JaneAnne Murray, argued that
upon being intercepted, Ahmed “ceased tweeting, returned to
school, and resumed his role as dutiful son caring for his younger
siblings” before being charged.297 Before his sentencing, she also
expressed hope that Ahmed’s life would not be disrupted because of
“youthful and idealistic choices.”298 At Ahmed’s sentencing, Ahmed
told the judge about his deradicalization process.299 He stated, “I
want you to understand I am not completely changed… I’m in the
process, but nobody changes overnight. I’m trying every day. I want
to reach that point.”300 Judge Michael Davis, in response,
encouraged Ahmed to continue changing his ideology by stating,
“[t]here is an opening for you,” and then using his fingers to
demonstrate a small space.301
c.

Sentence Comparison

Both Ahmed and Conley attempted, but failed, to travel abroad
to join ISIS. Even with the reduction, Ahmed’s sentence is more
than double the sentence that Conley received. The total disparity
between the sentences is 132 months, or six years.
This pair is an outlier for the infantilization analysis, because
both Conley and Ahmed were framed as being immature. Although
Conley was twenty-three at the time of the offense, Judge Moore

from pleading guilty, much to the young men's detriment”).
294. Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant,
United States v. Ahmed, 15-mj-95(SER) at 2-3 (2015) [hereinafter Ahmed
Supporting Affidavit]. Ahmed booked a flight to Istanbul and then a second
flight to Madrid, Spain to avoid detection. Id.
295. Id. at 5. Ahmed told FBI agents, “the truth is I really don’t know these
people,” after they inquired about whether he knew the other travelers. Id.
296. Id. at 6. On the Twitter account, there was a series of messages,
including one in which Ahmed wrote “Lol my bro I love you.” Id.
297. Declaration in Support of Motion to Amend/Correct for Concurrent
Sentencing, United States v. Ahmed, 15-CR-49 (MJD/FLN) at 7 (D. Minn. Nov.
28, 2016) [hereinafter Ahmed First Declaration in Support] (arguing that
Ahmed is less culpable for the crime than his co-defendants by virtue of his
return to normalcy upon being intercepted).
298. Matt Sepic, Sixth Minnesota ISIS Suspect Pleads Guilty as Trial Date
Nears, MPR NEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/25/sixthmn-isis-suspect-pleads-guilty-as-trial-date-nears.
299. Stephen Monemayor & Faiza Mahamud, Amid Tears and Confession,
3 More ISIL Defendants are Sentenced to Prison, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 16, 2016),
www.startribune.com/three-more-would-be-isil-fighters-due-in-minneapolisfederal-courtroom-for-sentencing-tuesday/401206765/.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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still referred to her as a “girl” and a “teenager” who was “young” and
“naïve.”302 Her attorney compared Conley to his nineteen-year-old
daughter and described her anger as “a little hissy.”303 He also
referred to Conley as being impressionable to “influences of
whatever flavor.”304 Likewise, the U.S. Attorney characterized her
as “pathologically naïve” and described her vision of Syria as
containing “moonbeams and gumdrops.”305 Ahmed was also defined
by his “youthful and idealistic” choices.306 This is likely because he
was nineteen when he was charged—younger than Conley.307 Yet,
at the same time he was also described as “dutiful” and “mature”
because he took care of his siblings.308
At first glance, the rhetoric might seem to diminish both actors’
autonomy equally. However, the contrast lies in the relative
maturity of each actor. Although Ahmed is younger, his actions are
framed in a way that makes them seem more responsible, which is
further emphasized by the judge’s remarks that Ahmed can change
his behavior.309 Meanwhile, the childlike imagery of moonbeams,
gumdrops, and hissy fits allows Conley to be seen as a “girl.”310 The
youthful and immature characterization made her appear less
capable of change because it allowed her attention-seeking behavior
to be seen as an intrinsic character trait.311 The relative level of
responsibility may have ultimately contributed to the more serious
charge being applied to Ahmed’s case because, while Conley was
charged with making false statements, he was charged with the
more serious crime of providing material support.
As mentioned briefly in the preceding comparison, there is also
a difference that appeared between males and females when it came
to court officials describing the issues of mental health and, in
contrast, the motive of loneliness. The difference is particularly
evident in the court’s treatment of Conley during her sentencing
hearing.312 While the court begins by stating, “[Conley] is in need of
psychiatric help,” before clarifying and saying that it is “not saying
that her decisions here were the direct product of a mental illness
. . . . But she is a bit of a mess.”313 Notably, the narrative of reliance
on other male fighters did not show up with Ahmed, who had

302. Martinez et al., supra note 279; Conley Sentencing Hearing, supra note
280, at 102.
303. Conley Sentencing Hearing, supra note 280, at 54.
304. Id. at 87.
305. Id. at 39.
306. Sepic, supra note 298.
307. Ahmed Criminal Complaint, supra note 291.
308. Ahmed First Declaration in Support, supra note 297.
309. Monemayor & Mahamud, supra note 299.
310. Martinez, et al., supra note 279.
311. Conley Sentencing Hearing, supra note 280, at 73.
312. Conley Sentencing Hearing, supra note 280, at 33.
313. Id.
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several co-conspirators,314 and who seemed to be primed for
commentary about his being potentially influenced by those coconspirators.
4. Comparison: Keonna Thomas & Saddam Mohamed
Raishani
a. Keonna Thomas
“I was, I guess at one point, impressionable.”315 This was the
justification that Keonna Thomas, then thirty-four, gave just before
being sentenced to 96-months imprisonment after pleading guilty
to providing material support.316 Thomas ran a Twitter account
where she frequently posted pro-ISIS propaganda.317 Through her
online activities, she met an ISIS fighter and married him online.318
Then, she began to make preparations to travel to Syria, indirectly,
by flying in through Spain.319
Both the prosecution and defense emphasized Thomas’s role as
a mother to two children. The prosecution focused on the idea that
“had the government not arrested Thomas, she would have followed
through with her plan to travel to Syria to join ISI[S], risking her
own life and leaving her two young children behind in Philadelphia
without their mother.”320 As well as stating, “[s]he apparently
intended to leave her two young children behind when she fled
without warning.”321
314. Ahmed Criminal Complaint, supra note 291.
315. Jeremy Roebuck, North Philly Woman Gets 8-Year Term For Plan To
Leave Kids, Marry IS Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 6, 2017), www.philly.com/
philly/news/pennsylvania/philadelphia/north-philly-mom-gets-8-year-term-forplan-to-leave-kids-marry-isis-soldier-20170906.html.
316. Id.
317. Affidavit of Martin McDonald, United Stated v. Thomas, 15-417-M at 2
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Thomas Supporting Affidavit]. For example,
she “re-posted on Twitter a photograph of a young male child wearing firearm
magazine pouches and camouflage attire, with the following caption: ‘Ask
yourselves, while this young man is holding magazines for the Islamic State,
what are you doing for it? #ISIS.’” Id.
318. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United Stated v. Thomas, 15171 at 2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Thomas Government’s Sentencing
Memorandum]. Further communications between Thomas and her husband,
Abu Khalid Al-Amriki, included the following exchange: “Al-Amriki sent an
electronic communication to Thomas stating, ‘U probably want to do Istishadee
[martyrdom operations] with me.’ Id. In response, Thomas stated, ‘that would
be amazing…. a girl can only wish.’ Id. Al-Amriki then responded, ‘I can make
that wish come true.’” Id. at 3.
319. Thomas Supporting Affidavit, supra note 317, at 5.
320. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Thomas, 15171 at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Thomas Government’s Sentencing
Memorandum].
321. Transcript of Probable Cause Hearing, United States v. Thomas, 2:15-
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Defense counsel rebutted that statement by emphasizing that
she did care for her two children by telling the court that she was
arrested while “cooking breakfast for her two children.”322 Defense
counsel also mentioned that “[Thomas] carries significant guilt,
finding it difficult to fathom how she could ever have considered
abandoning her children.”323 Later, the defense counsel noted that,
“Ms. Thomas was a lonely, depressed, anxiety-ridden mother who
spent too much time on the internet . . . she never gave ISI[S]
anything of value—except her love.”324
The court noted that the two sides framed her communications
with ISIS as either “some kind of flirtation” or “conspiratorial in
terms of being interested in martyrdom.”325 During that same
hearing, the court emphasized that “it doesn't take a lot of
imagination for a lawyer to want to argue” to a jury that “Ms.
Thomas was interested in being a suicide bomber.”326
b. Saddam Mohamed Raishani
“I no longer hold the same views that I had when I came in,”
Saddam Mohamed Raishani read as he appeared for his sentencing
hearing.327 At thirty-two years old, Raishani pled guilty to
attempting to provide material support for terrorism and was
sentenced to 240-months imprisonment.328 He was arrested by
officers at an airport while attempting to board a flight to Turkey,
which he hoped would ultimately bring him to his final destination:
ISIS-controlled Syrian territory.329 Prior to his attempted trip,
Raishani watched ISIS propaganda videos and messaged “a
mj-00417-1 at 36 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Thomas Probable Cause
Hearing].
322. Id. at 43.
323. Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, United Stated v. Thomas, 15171 at 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Thomas Defendant’s Sentencing
Memorandum].
324. Id. at 9. Defense counsel also explained, “[o]ver the course of two years,
her engagement with various Islamic websites and online religious fora led her
to seek a faithful, Muslim husband, which she believed she had found in
unindicted co-conspirator number two—a member of ISIL in Raqqa, Syria. Ms.
Thomas’s intention was to become his wife.” Id. at 5.
325. Hearing, United States v. Thomas, 15-CR-171-1 at 8 (E.D. Pa. May 12,
2016) [hereinafter Thomas Hearing].
326. Id.
327. Kalyan Kuman, ISIS In New York? Man Sentenced 20 Years For
Providing Support To Terrorism, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019),
www.ibtimes.com/isis-new-york-man-sentenced-20-years-providing-supportterrorists-2782466.
328. Id. (noting that he was “sentenced to 20 years in prison with a top-up
of another 20 years on supervised release”); Raishani Complaint, supra note
174; The Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Raishani,
17 Cr. 421 (RA) at 1 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Raishani Government
Sentencing Memorandum].
329. Raishani Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 328, at 2.
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purported ISIS affiliate who could help facilitate Raishani’s travel
to ISIS-controlled territory once he reached Turkey,” but did not
post the videos to social media.330 He intended to travel without his
wife or their young son.331
As in Thomas’ case, family became a central theme for both
parties. Defense counsel also focused on Raishani’s family,
emphasizing that Raishani does care about his wife, but that recent
hardships took a toll on his mental health.332 The defense quoted
his wife’s statement, in which she stated that she believed the
catalyst for his radicalization was that,
following harassing incidents at work due to Raishani’s religion, he
became sad. She reportedly witnessed him crying alone and when
asked what was wrong, he would not say why he was crying. Ms. Al
Samet [Rashani’s wife] believes that it may have been sometime after
losing his job at the hospital, that the defendant began initiating a
plan to leave the U.S.333

Defense counsel then emphasized Raishani’s history of anxiety and
feelings of isolation due to a history of bullying during primary
school.334
Likewise, the prosecutors in Raishani’s case emphasized his
role as a father, stating, “Raishani was willing to give up
everything—his job, his family, and his life—to further ISIS’s
mission of hate, terror, and violence.”335 The prosecution went on to
say that he “abandoned” his family—emphasizing that “[h]is
devotion to ISIS was so fervent, so complete, that he chose it over
his family.”336 The prosecution described him as “cold, calculating,
and terrifying.”337
In response to the government, defense counsel argued that
“the Government wants Raishani to spend twenty-five years in jail
for trying to join ISIS to provide medical services,” referencing
Raishani’s background as a nurse.338 Defense counsel characterized
the government’s sentencing memorandum as “both xenophobic and
330. Id. at 4-5.
331. Id. at 6.
332. Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Adam Raishani,
United States v. Raishani, 17 Cr. 421 (RA) at 3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019)
[hereinafter Raishani Defense Sentencing Memorandum] (nothing that
“[n]otwithstanding that it was an arranged marriage, defendant described his
wife as a “sweet, beautiful and supportive” person and stated that they share a
good relationship”).
333. Id. at 3 (quoting the probation report).
334. Id. at 4.
335. Raishani Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 328, at 13.
336. Id. at 16.
337. Id.
338. Letter to The Honorable Ronnie Abrams from Gerald J. McMahon,
United States v. Raishani, 17 Cr. 421 (RA) at 2-3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019)
(written in response to the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum)
[hereinafter Raishani Letter]. See Raishani Defense Sentencing Memorandum,
supra note 332, at 5 (referencing his career as a nurse).
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jingoistic.”339 This was argued because the government’s sentencing
memorandum focused on sentencing “Raishani for how bad ISIS is;
not for how bad Raishani is.”340 Defense counsel went on to
emphasize that “in the eyes of history, one person’s terrorist
organization is another person’s freedom-fighting army,” before
describing two organizations that portray how “[t]oday’s terrorist
may be tomorrow’s statesman.”341 The judge, in response, stated,
“[i]t’s not about culture, it’s not about religion. But it is about
terrorism.”342
c.

Sentence Comparison

Both Thomas and Rashini attempted to join ISIS abroad, but
were arrested before their plans came to fruition. Despite the
emphasis on parenting and mental health for both, the total
sentencing disparity was 144 months, or twelve years.
As mentioned previously, both the prosecution and defense
focused on Thomas’ role as a mother when discussing the
appropriate sentence for her.343 The government framed her
attempt to join ISIS as an abandonment of her two young
children.344 In contrast, her attorney argued that she still cared for
her children, up to the day that she was arrested and taken away
from them.345 She was still given a lesser sentence than Raishani,
who was also portrayed as abandoning his wife and kids by
“choosing [ISIS] over his family.”346
Raishani, as well, provides an example of politics being used as
a foil for infantilization. His attorney frequently described his
actions by comparing his beliefs and political motivations to other
terrorist groups—suggesting that he might be a freedom fighter.347
Meanwhile, Thomas’ communications with ISIS members was
described as “flirtation” by the court.348 This is significant because
the political motivations reinforce the mainstream notion that men
have more nuanced and serious reasons for committing attacks
than women, who are seen as naïve and vulnerable to suave male
propagandists.349
Interestingly, Thomas was sentenced to eight years
imprisonment, which was the highest of the four women
339. Raishani Letter, supra note 338, at 1.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1-2.
342. Kuman, supra note 327.
343. Thomas Probable Cause Hearing, supra note 321, at 36; Thomas
Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 323, at 43.
344. Thomas Probable Cause Hearing, supra note 321, at 36.
345. Id.
346. Raishani Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 328, at 13.
347. Raishani Letter, supra note 338, at 1.
348. Thomas Hearing, supra note 325.
349. Nacos, supra note 4.
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analyzed.350 Thus, although it may not seem to have as great of an
effect as the other framing narratives on the disparity between
opposing genders, the familial narrative may provide insight into
the sentences given to women, generally.

IV. PROPOSAL
The gendered narratives surrounding women who join ISIS
presents a unique problem to the criminal justice system. These
narratives have the effect of causing disproportionate sentences
between men and women convicted for the same charges. There are
three potential solutions to combat this issue: addressing the
narratives, addressing the sentences, or addressing the underlying
goal behind the convictions—preventing future crimes.

A. Addressing Narratives
The first potential solution to the issue is addressing the
underlying narratives behind the sentences. This process has to
take place within the media and the courtroom in order to be
effective. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the framing of
women in the media influences how the public perceives female
terrorists.351 Likewise, prior research has noted that lenient
sentences in favor of women tend to reflect a pattern of “chivalry”
and “paternalism” among the male judiciary and prosecutors.352
This pattern also stems from a pattern of infantilizing women and
perceiving female offenders as “childlike and dependent.”353
Combined, these two factors may influence the perception of
women, such that framing narratives become prevalent across a
variety of cases.
To address these underlying framing narratives, both the
media and the legal profession need to be educated on the reality of
female terrorists and their capabilities for deadly and dangerous
attacks. By the same token, the same media and legal professionals
must be educated on the motivating factors of male terrorists. This
is because the disparity is present for both male and female
offenders. Therefore, it follows that taking a more understanding
approach may lower sentences for male offenders, as well, which
will effectively equalize the sentencing disparities. This will remedy
the disparity without overburdening the criminal justice system
with higher sentences for all offenders. Afterwards, those lessons
350. The Cases, supra note 108.
351. Id.
352. Ann M. Stacey, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis
of Sentences Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District
Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 47 (2006).
353. Id. at 48.
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must begin to be reflected in the conversations and comments that
both journalists and legal professionals make when referring to
offenders. This multi-faceted approach is the only way to ensure
that perceptions continue to evolve in a uniform way.
The main issue with this proposal is that it is impractical to
suggest that these narratives can be addressed in the legal system
and in the media. It would require a system that addresses
underlying sexist narratives in most facets of society, which is,
unfortunately, unrealistic. Until this change occurs, the same deepseated and prevalent social attitudes and perceptions will continue
to be widespread. A more attainable alternative is to rethink the
place of lawyers and judges in the criminal justice system when they
demonstrate an unwillingness to address the underlying framing
narratives and misconceptions behind the disparities.354 However,
that, too, cannot be implemented on a large-scale. Regardless of the
approach, a proposal to address framing narratives cannot be
implemented in a cost-effective and efficient way. Moreover, the
multi-faceted changes that need to occur are too pervasive to be able
to apply quickly.

B. Addressing Sentences
The second proposed solution is to modify the sentencing
guidelines such that there is more uniformity, regardless of gender.
One proposal that has been suggested is to categorize the sentences
based on the roles the terrorists play in the plot.355 As was noted
earlier, the women who join ISIS play a variety of roles—recruiter,
auxiliary, and fighter. Sentencing guidelines could be modified in
order to reflect the “level” of involvement with the group.
Particularly, these categories would carry the same weight for both
male and female terrorists. This approach reinforces the traditional
notions of fairness in the legal system.356 This is because
“[p]unishing offenders to a degree inconsistent with the nature of
354. Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal
Cases, 17 (U. of Mich. L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 57, 2012)
repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=law_econ_
current. This remedy was proposed earlier by Prof. Starr, who wrote, “[i]f
prosecutors, judges, and legislators are comfortable with those factors playing
a role in the sentencing of women, then perhaps it is worth explicitly
reconsidering their place in criminal sentencing more generally.” Id.
355. David Dagan, Women Aren’t Always Sentenced By the Book. And Maybe
They
Shouldn’t
Be,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar.
30,
2018),
www.fivethirtyeight.com/features/women-arent-always-sentenced-by-the-bookmaybe-men-shouldnt-be-either/. This proposal was originally given in the
context of drug-dealing. Id.
356. Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured
Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of
Female Offenders under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 181, 196 (1994).
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their crimes and the level of culpability is unjust.”357 Instead, the
same crime should hold the same punishment, without regard to
the gender of the offender.
The first issue with this proposal is that it reduces the
discretion of judges by taking away the ability to assess the
individual characteristics of the terrorists.358 For instance, even if a
terrorist only had a minor role in the operation initially, he or she
could have aspirations of playing a larger role one day.359 On the
other hand, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that judges
are not bound by sentencing guidelines.360 Therefore, even if these
sentencing guidelines were imposed, the judges would not be
strictly bound by the guidelines, and the same disparities could
continue. Another problem with this proposal is that longer prison
sentences could also have the potential to increase radicalization
and undermine national security goals.361 This is because “[l]ong
prison sentences and stripped citizenship will contribute to the
‘othering’ of foreign fighters and further impede rehabilitation,”
which can lead to recidivism upon release.362 Regardless of gender,
there is still the underlying concern that the individual will pose a
risk of recidivism.
Therefore, although this proposal is more realistic than
addressing framing narratives, revising sentencing guidelines may
not be an effective way to address the disparities between male and
female offenders.

C. Addressing Recidivism
A final approach would be to revise the sentencing surrounding
all people convicted of terrorism offenses, regardless of their gender,
by modifying their sentence to include judicially mandated
programming on deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration.
This would ensure that regardless of the length of the sentence, both
males and females will have the same type of deradicalization
357. Id.
358. Kelly Berkell, Risk Reduction in Terrorism Cases: Sentencing and the
Post-Conviction Environment, 13 J. DERADICALIZATION 276, 321 (2017)
(describing a potential plan to create uniform sentencing guidelines but noting
that “such provisions would tend to reduce judicial discretion in handling
unique cases and fact patterns”).
359. Conley Criminal Complaint, supra note 136, at 4. Conley stated that
she wanted to be a nurse, however she was open to the idea of being a fighter,
too. Id.
360. Charles Lane, Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory, WASH.
POST (Jan. 13, 2005), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33362005Jan12.html.
361. Ester E. J. Strommen, Jihadi Brides or Female Foreign Fighters?
Women in Da’esh from Recruitment to Sentencing, 2017 PRIO CTR. GENDER,
PEACE, & SECURITY 1, 4.
362. Id.
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programs. Ultimately, the deradicalization approach addresses the
underlying concern of recidivism.
As demonstrated by Conley’s Facebook post,363 once people who
are convicted of terrorism are released, they pose a significant risk
of recidivism.364 Even with the sentencing disparities, this issue is
common among all people convicted of terrorism and should
therefore be the focus of any remedy. Additionally, unlike the other
proposals, this approach is more realistic.
This particular approach is vital because it addresses the
primary concern of reintegration with society.365 As Conley
demonstrated with her post-imprisonment Facebook activity,
incarceration does not properly address the underlying counterviolent extremism needs.366 In fact, post-9/11 congressional
hearings noted that extremists will often plan attacks, radicalize
other individuals, or meet similar-minded radicalized individuals
from within prison walls.367 To address this problem, the
individuals must be deradicalized while serving their sentences.
This is particularly imperative as over eighty individuals convicted
of terrorism will be released by 2024 alone.368 Ultimately, a
deradicalization program will have a more positive impact on
counter-violent extremism than any mandatory prison sentence
restriction initiative ever could.
There are several factors that determine how effective a
deradicalization program may be, such as the motive behind
radicalization, whether disengagement from the group was
voluntary, and the willingness to cooperate with law enforcement
officials.369 These programs can be structured in a variety of ways.
The most common approach is a “government sponsored,
comprehensive approach, which includes controlled levels of
363. Martinez, et al., supra note 279.
364. U.N. Security Council Counter Terrorism Council Comm. Exec.
Directorate, supra note 51.
365. GEORGIA HOLMER & ADRIAN SHTUNI, U.S. INST. PEACE RETURNING
FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE REINTEGRATION IMPERATIVE 2 (2017) (noting,
“[r]eintegration refers to the reestablishment of social, familial, and community
ties and positive participation in society. Developing successful reintegration
programs is crucial not only to preventing recidivism among returnees but also
to mitigating further radicalization among the youth population and building
overall community-level resilience to violent extremism”).
366. Donati, supra note 210.
367. Bennett Clifford, Rethinking “Prison Radicalisation”—Lessons from the
U.S. Federal Correctional System, INT’L CTR. COUNTER-TERRORISM—THE
HAGUE (Nov. 16, 2018), icct.nl/publication/rethinking-prison-radicalisationlessons-from-the-u-s-federal-correctional-system/.
While
this
form
of
radicalization has been discussed among elected officials and government
employees, attacks from these individuals have “so far failed to materialize on
a large scale.” Id.
368. Id.
369. Order, United States of America v. John Doe, 14-CR-00612-001 1, 17
(2018) (quoting Seamus Hughes as he highlighted the various factors that play
a role in deradicalization and disengagement).
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amnesty, psychological and ideological support, financial support,
and extensive after-care in the form of education and job assistance”
which can take place over several months or several years.370
In Europe, “Exit Programs” have been successful in
deradicalizing far-right individuals.371 Specifically, in Germany,
500 individuals have gone through the program since 2000 with
only a three percent recidivism rate.372 These programs focus on
rebuilding positive family ties, finding a job, increasing community
relationships, and potentially relocating the individual.373
One judge in Minnesota is attempting to tackle
deradicalization through counseling, where the radicalized
individual is given a reading list that includes philosophy,
biographies, and other literature in an effort to help him
rehabilitate his ideology and life choices.374 Additionally, the
individual is placed in a halfway house where he meets with
religious figures, legal professionals, and program staff.375
Saudi Arabia has also had success with a similar
deradicalization program, with only a ten to twenty percent
recidivism rate.376 One scholar notes that this program is successful
because of the “three-pronged effort to break and replace all levels
of an individual’s commitment to a violent extremist group,
370. Stefanie Mitchell, Deradicalization: Using Triggers for the Development
of a US Program, 9 J. DERADICALIZATION 101, 105 (2016).
371. Id. (noting, “[t]hese programmes not only break down movements
themselves, they also offer good value for money: they prevent criminal action
and violent action, undercut the costs of incarceration, and ensure individuals
who would otherwise be entrenched in lives of criminality become productive
members of society”).
372. Id. In comparison, the average European recidivism rate for all crimes
was about 67.8% between 2005-2010. Id. at 105-06.
373. HOLMER & SHTUNI, supra note 365, at 1 (elaborating that the program
uses “psychosocial modalities and rel[ies] on individual mentoring and
personalized interventions, coupled with efforts to repair family ties and
community relationships and build technical job-relevant skills . . . . In some
cases, when separation from the violent group is deemed a physical threat, these
programs help relocate an individual or provide other forms of security”).
374. Joanna Walters, An Incredible Transformation': How Rehab, Not
Prison, Worked for a US ISIS Convert, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2018),
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/04/american-isis-abdullahi-yousufrehabilatation (quoting one of his lawyers as stating, “[h]is transformation has
been incredible. He went from being a surly, closed-down kid to this really open,
warm, intelligent, thoughtful, introspective young man, who recognizes why
he’d been attracted to Isis and why there are so many other options for him”).
375. Mitchell, supra note 370, at 108 (describing how this was the first
initiative of its kind within the United States).
376. Jessica Stern, Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist
Extremists, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2010), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
saudi-arabia/2009-12-21/mind-over-martyr
(emphasizing,
“[t]he
Saudi
government has not disclosed the total number of people who have completed
its program, but as of 2009, 11 graduates had ended up on the country's mostwanted terrorist list. Still, according to official statistics, the rate of recidivism
is 10-20 percent, far lower than that for ordinary criminals”).
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including affective (defined by social factors such as emotional
support, sense of community, and social obligation), pragmatic
(logistical factors such as financial stability, education, vocational
training, and skill-building), and ideological bonds.”377
Implementing a wide-scale deradicalization and reintegration
program within the United States will combat the risk of recidivism.
This system should be modeled to address four main issues that
individuals face: grievances,378 ideology,379 networks,380 and
environment.381
First, the program must address the underlying socioeconomic
or political grievances of individuals. Grievances are feelings of
strain and resentment due to a perceived wrongfulness or unfair
treatment.382 For example, grievances can be triggered by losing a
job,383 feeling unwelcomed in society,384 or emotional struggles. This
can be addressed by teaching marketable job skills and
reintroducing Western philosophy and history in a way that
promotes pro-social feelings. The aim in these particular cases
should be to decrease instances of strain due to a feeling that being

377. HOLMER & SHTUNI, supra note 365, at 8 (describing that “these
components, when combined, may facilitate reentry of former detainees into
society, reduce social alienation, foster stability, and reduce the likelihood of
recidivism. In this way, these early efforts emphasized the critical role of social
and community relations in a person’s entry and exit into a violent extremist
group or movement”).
378. John Horgan, From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes
Perspectives Form Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism, 618 THE
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 80 (2008). There is a noteworthy
trend that various social factors that may add strain to an individual, which
ultimately compels them to commit an act of terrorism. Id.
379. Alex S. Wilner & Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, Transformative
Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamic Radicalization, 34 STUD.
IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 418, 422 (2011). After experiencing a grievance, and
individual may accommodate their worldview wo regain an “understanding of
events…which allows them to regain a sense of self-coherence and competence.”
Id.
380. Mohammed Hafez & Creighton Mullins, The Radicalization Puzzle: A
Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism, 38
STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 958, 964 (2015). “[P]reexisting friendship and
kinship ties facilitate recruitment” into terrorist groups. Id.
381. Horgan, supra note 378, at 88 (noting “the social setting (implicit or
explicit approval from peers and family) appeared to be the source of the
greatest apparent positive quality for joining”).
382. See GEORGE B. VOLD, THOMAS J. BERNARD, & JEFFREY B. SNIPES,
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 173 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that strain arises during
“a situation in which the social structure fails to provide legitimate means to
achieve what the culture values”).
383. See Council on Hemispheric Affs., FARC—Rebels With a Cause?, COHA
(July 6, 2010), www.coha.org/farc-–-rebels-with-a-cause/ (noting that many
women claimed that they joined the terrorist group known as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] to maintain a level of financial stability that
is comparable to males in Colombia).
384. Hafez & Mullins, supra note 380, at 962.
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Muslim and American is incompatible.385 This must be paired with
individual or group counseling in order for the individualized
grievances to be addressed properly and for maximum benefit to the
individual.
Second, the program must address underlying ideological
beliefs by introducing the individual to less radical and violent
Muslim ideology. Particularly, young radicals may become
radicalized after speaking to a well-spoken radical who quotes
scripture in a way that advocates for the use of violence in a
charismatic and persuasive way.386 It is noteworthy that studies
have indicated that religion is not the root cause of terrorism, but
rather the propaganda being taught to the individuals.387 This is
particularly important when considering the impressionability of
young people or those impacted by the aforementioned grievances.
This portion of radicalization can be mitigated by incorporating
moderate religious leaders into the program and allowing the
radicalized individual to understand that there is more to religion
than violence. The aim of this should be to introduce positive
ideologies to the individuals.
Next, the program should work on strengthening positive
networks and community connections. Particularly, this should
increase a feeling of strong positive social connections and support,
as well as promote a sense of community involvement. Successful
programs should also consider pairing a radicalized individual with
a successfully deradicalized individual as part of a mentorship
program. This will allow the radicalized individual to feel that
rehabilitation is achievable and beneficial.
Finally, if the individual’s environment is incompatible with
rehabilitation—for instance because there is evidence of a larger
network of radicalized individuals—then a relocation program
should be put in place. The importance of this aspect cannot be
understated. In complex situations, such as periods of social change
or when experiencing grievances, individuals may conform to the
behaviors of the people that they are surrounded by.388 This
analysis is vital in understanding how even one extremist mentality
can have effects on an entire group or cell of people. After all, recent
studies have demonstrated that “80 percent of new recruits to the
385. Id. In some cases “xenophobia combines with Islamophobia to create a
hostile environment for those that embrace the Islamic identity” creating a
feeling that being Muslim and American is incompatible. Id.
386. Wilner & Dubolouz, supra note 379, at 428.
387. Id. Ed Husain, writer of the Islamist and former radical, noted that the
mosque he attended was “buzzing with young, trim-bearded English-speaking
activists” who made the prospect of radical Islam seem attractive and modern—
especially when compared to the old, rambling Imams at his mosque. Id. This
dynamic at the mosque was what convinced him to start his path toward
radicalization. Id.
388. DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE
209 (2003).
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global Salafi jihad become disaffected and are radicalized within
their diaspora communities.”389 By removing the individual from
this environment, the program will attempt to ensure that the
individual is not trapped in a toxic environment that would lead to
recidivism.
One major drawback to this approach is that it does not directly
address the sentencing disparities. However, this approach does go
towards the ultimate issue of recidivism. Regardless of the
sentence, if the individual is released back into society and still
poses a security threat, then the criminal justice system would not
be effectively addressing the issue of extremism. An additional
benefit of this particular structure is that it addresses the four
major reasons that researchers have noticed that people often
commit these acts.390 This is particularly important because
approaching the sentences by focusing on reducing recidivism
necessitates addressing the underlying issues. Therefore, although
the approach does not address the overall issue of the existence of
sentencing disparities, the approach is more realistic and attainable
than the other approaches.

V. CONCLUSION
The sentencing disparities between males and females
convicted of terrorism offenses since the rise of ISIS in America are
stark. Females tend to get lesser sentences than their male
counterparts. The rhetoric of the legal professionals involved in the
cases demonstrate that the sentencing disparities are due to the
notions that women are more naïve, lonely, or innocent than males
when it comes to such violent crimes. Addressing the narratives
surrounding women would require an upheaval of social norms in
the legal system, mass media, and society as a whole. This is
unrealistic. Longer prison sentences themselves are problematic as
well, because they decrease judicial autonomy and may increase
recidivism.
Thus, the focus must be on creating a viable rehabilitation
program that is required for all individuals, regardless of gender.
Ideally, this mandated program will address the root causes of
extremism and radicalization such that when the individual does
complete their sentence, they will be able to reintegrate back into
society as a deradicalized individual. This type of program will
address the greater concerns of national security even with the
sentencing disparities in place.
In general, it is important to keep in mind the framing
389. Jerrold M. Post & Gabriel Sheffer, Risk of Radicalization and
Terrorism in U.S. Muslim Communities, 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFFAIRS 101, 110
(2007).
390. Horgan, supra note 378.
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narratives that surround the sentencing disparities between males
and females. Understanding and recognizing those narratives will
also have a positive impact on how the judicial system combats
extremism. The more cognizant legal officials are of these
narratives, the more effective our counter-violent extremism
approaches can be.

